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W hile preparing for trial, defense counsel learns that a
key prosecution witness has undergone psychotherapy
or other counseling. Under what circumstances, if any, should
counsel be allowed to examine or use records of that therapy or
counseling to impeach the witness's testimony?'
The situation arises most often in sexual-assault or child abuse
cases, because complainants in such cases often seek, or are
taken to, counselors of various kinds to help them deal with what
has happened (or what they claim has happened). But it also
arises in a wide range of other criminal cases, for example where
a key witness in a homicide case has had a lengthy record of
treatment for various mental and emotional problems, or for
2drug or alcohol abuse.
1 Access to the records is of course not counsel's ultimate goal; it is an attempt to
discover information that can be used to cross-examine the witness at trial, or to
provide a basis to call the therapist or counselor as a witness and question him or
her about the witness's condition and treatment.
2 See, e.g., Doe v. Diamond, 964 F.2d 1325, 1329 (2d Cir. 1992) (extortion);
United States v. Mazzola, 217 F.R.D. 84, 89-90 (D. Mass. 2003) (tax fraud); United
States v. Alperin, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1255 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (assaulting a federal
agent); United States v. Hansen, 955 F. Supp. 1225, 1226 (D. Mont. 1997) (murder);
People v. Gurule, 51 P.3d 224, 249-51 (Cal. 2002) (robbery-murder); State v. Peeler,
857 A.2d 808, 841-44 (Conn. 2004) (murder); State v. Bruno, 673 A.2d 1117, 1124-
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The issue raises profound questions about the conflict
between various privileges recognized in the law, and a
defendant's rights to confront and cross-examine his accusers, to
use compulsory process to call witnesses, and to due process of
law. The only Supreme Court decision on the subject, decided in
1987, barely scratched the surface.3
I
THE ISSUES
In the ensuing two decades, the law on this subject has
become an incredible hodgepodge of conflicting approaches and
procedural conundrums, including the following:
a. Is the Confrontation Clause applicable to pretrial
discovery?
4
b. Does it matter whether the privilege on its face is
conditional or absolute? If the privilege is absolute, but a court
determines that the defendant has a constitutional right to the
information, does the witness nevertheless retain the right to
insist on the privilege, and if so, how should this affect the
witness's testimony at trial?
5
c. Does it matter whether the records in question are in the
possession of the prosecutor, an unrelated state agency, or a
private entity 6
d. Assuming the defendant can overcome the privilege, is
counsel entitled to examine the records, or only to an in camera
review of the records by the trial judge, and if so, when? 7
e. What kind of allegation or showing must the defendant
make to trigger a review of the records?
8
f. Under what circumstances must a judge release relevant
portions of the records to defense counsel? 9
31 (Conn. 1996) (murder); People v. Bean, 560 N.E.2d 258, 269 (Ill. 1990) (murder);
People v. Dace, 449 N.E.2d 1031, 1035 (I11. App. Ct. 1983) (burglary); State v.
Taylor, 134 S.W.3d 21, 26-27 (Mo. 2004) (en banc) (murder).
3 Ritchie v. Pennsylvania, 480 U.S. 39 (1987) (plurality opinion); see infra Part
III.B.
4 See infra Part III.B.1.
5 See infra Part IV.A.
6 See infra Part IV.B.
7 See infra Part V.A.1.
8 See infra Part V.B.
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This Article describes the current, confused state of the law
and offers a series of suggestions to bring order out of chaos.
II
THE PRIVILEGES
The issues discussed in this Article arise in connection with a
variety of privileges, each of which involves communications
(and records) of therapy or counseling of one kind or another.
A. The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
By the mid-1990s, every state had codified a privilege for
communications between a patient or client and a psychologist
or psychiatrist,' ° and had also codified a privilege for
communications between a patient or client and a psychiatric
social worker." In 1996, the Supreme Court, in Jaffee v.
Redmond,12 held that federal courts likewise must recognize a
psychotherapist-patient privilege, and held further that the
privilege covers a patient or client's confidential communications
with duly licensed psychiatrists, psychologists, or social workers
"in the course of psychotherapy."' 13 The privilege, the Court
directed, is absolute, because "[m]aking the promise of
confidentiality contingent upon a trial judge's later evaluation of
the relative importance of the patient's interest in privacy and
the evidentiary need for disclosure would eviscerate the
effectiveness of the privilege. 1 4
In Jaffee, the Court made no attempt to "delineate [the] fullS• 15
contours" of the privilege, other than to recognize that
circumstances could exist where the privilege "must give way.'
' 6
That case involved a civil plaintiff's attempts to obtain a civil
9 See infra Part V.A.4.
10 For a listing of such provisions, see EDWARD J. IMWINKELREID, THE NEW
WIGMORE: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES app. d (2002) ("A State-by-State Survey of
the Principle Privilege Statutes and Court Rules").
11 For a listing of such provisions, see id.
12 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
13 Id. at 15.
14 Id. at 17.
15 Id. at 18.
16 Id. at 18 n.19. As an example, the Court cited a situation in which the only way
to avert a threat to the patient or others is to reveal the communication. Id.
20071
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defendant's records of psychotherapy. 17 Thus, Jaffee provides no
clear guidance to federal courts where a criminal defendant
seeks a government witness's counseling or therapy records.
Nor does it indicate whether any federal constitutional
considerations might limit a State's authority to restrict or forbid
discovery of otherwise-privileged information in criminal cases.
B. Other Privileges
Counseling specialties have emerged for which similar
privileges have been created by statute. Enactment of a
statutory privilege is important because in many states, the
counselors are not licensed psychiatrists, psychologists, or social
18workers, and therefore do not fall within the traditional doctor-
patient or patient-psychotherapist privileges.
Many jurisdictions have enacted privileges to protect
communications made by victims of child abuse, including sexual
abuse. These privileges cover communications to counselors
who attempt to help the child deal with what has happened, and
also cover communications by other adults to the counselors
about the abuse.
Often the counselor is affiliated with a state agency or state-
funded agency affiliated with the court system. In Pennsylvania
v. Ritchie,'9 the Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion,
acknowledged that such a privilege serves important social goals:
Child abuse is one of the most difficult crimes to detect and
prosecute, in large part because there often are no witnesses
except the victim. A child's feelings of vulnerability and guilt
and his or her unwillingness to come forward are particularly
acute when the abuser is a parent. It therefore is essential that
the child have a state-designated person to whom he may turn,
and to do so with the assurance of confidentiality. Relatives
and neighbors who suspect abuse also will be more willing to
17 Id. at 4.
18 In Massachusetts, for example, a "sexual assault counselor" is defined as:
[A] person who is employed by or is a volunteer in a rape crisis center, has
undergone thirty-five hours of training, who reports to and is under the
direct control and supervision of a licensed social worker, nurse,
psychiatrist, psychologist or psychotherapist and whose primary purpose is
the rendering of advice, counseling or assistance to victims of sexual
assault.
MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 233, § 20J (LexisNexis 2000).
19 480 U.S. 39 (1987) (plurality opinion).
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come forward if they know that their identities will be
protected. Recognizing this, the Commonwealth-like all
other States-has made a commendable effort to assure
victims and witnesses that they may speak to the [state
agency's] counselors without fear of general disclosure.
20
If such "confidential material had to be disclosed upon demand
to a defendant charged with criminal child abuse," the Court
added, the purpose of the provision would be undermined.21
According to the Court,"[n]either precedent nor common sense
requires such a result.,
22
Similarly, many states have enacted a testimonial privilege for
communications by sexual-assault victims (whether children or
adults) to counselors who attempt to help the victims, 23 and for
20 Id. at 60-61 (footnote omitted).
21 Id. at 61.
22 Id.
23 For a listing of such provisions, see IMWINKELREID, supra note 10, at app. d.
At least one federal court has also recognized such a privilege. See United States v.
Lowe, 948 F. Supp. 97 (D. Mass. 1996). Because the complainant in that case
waived the privilege, the court was not called upon to determine whether the
privilege was qualified or absolute. Id. at 100. In Commonwealth v. Wilson, 602
A.2d 1290 (Pa. 1992), Pennsylvania's highest court explained why such
communications should be privileged:
Extensive research has been conducted documenting the severe
psychological, emotional, and social difficulties suffered by rape victims,
which cause a condition known as "rape trauma syndrome." The
devastating effects of this condition create a compelling need for a
confidential counseling relationship to enable the victim to cope with the
trauma. It is generally recognized that rape traumatizes its victim to a
degree far beyond that experienced by victims of other crimes. Rape crisis
centers have been developed nationwide to help victims of this most
degrading offense recover from its debilitating effects.
Rape crisis centers are service facilities staffed with counselors
extensively trained in crisis counseling. These counselors provide victims
with much needed physical, psychological and social support during the
recovery period that the victims otherwise might not be able to afford. At
the onset of counseling the victim is informed that her communications will
be confidential, and her willingness to disclose information quite obviously
is based upon that expectation. The very nature of the relationship
between a counselor and the victim of such a crime exposes the necessity
for the same confidentiality that would exist if private psychotherapeutic
treatment were obtained. If that confidentiality is removed, that trust is
severely undermined, and the maximum therapeutic benefit is lost. The
inability of the crisis center to achieve its goals is detrimental not only to
the victim but also to society, whose interest in the report and prosecution
of sexual assault crimes is furthered by the emotional and physical well-
being of the victim.
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communications between domestic violence victims and
counselors (sometimes called "advocates") who specialize in
assisting such victims. 24  A number of jurisdictions also have
enacted privileges protecting statements made by patients or
25clients in substance abuse counseling.
Id. at 1295 (quoted approvingly in State v. Pinder, 678 So. 2d 410, 415 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1996)).
Thus, recognition of the privilege will encourage rape victims to seek professional
help in dealing with what they have suffered, and will encourage victims to report
the crime and cooperate in the prosecution of the perpetrators. See generally
Jennifer L. Hebert, Note, Mental Health Records in Sexual Assault Cases: Striking a
Balance to Ensure a Fair Trial for Victims and Defendants, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1453
(2005) (discussing the necessary balance between the defendant's constitutional
rights and the privacy rights of the victim); Maureen B. Hogan, Note, The
Constitutionality of an Absolute Privilege for Rape Crisis Counseling: A Criminal
Defendant's Sixth Amendment Rights Versus a Rape Victim's Right to Confidential
Therapeutic Counseling, 30 B.C. L. REV. 411 (1989). Similarly, see Commonwealth
v. Fuller, 667 N.E.2d 847, 852 (Mass. 1996), abrogated by Commonwealth v. Dwyer,
859 N.E.2d 400 (Mass. 2006), one of a series of cases in which Massachusetts
established an elaborate procedure for protecting such records and
communications. In Commmonwealth v. Dwyer, 859 N.E.2d 400 (Mass. 2006),
Massachusetts's Supreme Court significantly reduced such protections in favor of
defense counsel's right to access such records. See infra Part V.A.1.
24 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-107(k)(I) (West 2006); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 90.5036(1)(d) (West 1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.220(1)(5) (West 2003); 23
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6116 (West 2001). In general, see U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
REPORT TO CONGRESS: THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN
SEXUAL ASSAULT OR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS AND THEIR COUNSELORS:
FINDINGS AND MODEL LEGISLATION (1995), which in an appendix, lists and
categorizes state provisions. Id. at app. 2. For a detailed discussion of the rationale
underlying the creation of the privilege, see People v. Turner, 109 P.3d 639, 642-44
(Colo. 2005).
25 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2 (2006) (entitled "Confidentiality of records").
Section (a) establishes a general rule of confidentiality, subject to exceptions.
§ 290dd-2(a). Section (b)(2)(C) authorizes disclosure of the records:
If authorized by an appropriate order of a court of competent jurisdiction
granted after application showing good cause therefor, including the need
to avert a substantial risk of death or serious bodily harm. In assessing
good cause the court shall weigh the public interest and the need for
disclosure against the injury to the patient, to the physician-patient
relationship, and to the treatment services.
§ 290dd-2(b)(2)(C). The court must specify what may be disclosed and establish
"appropriate safeguards against unauthorized disclosure." Id.
Some states include communications to substance abuse counselors in general
privilege or confidentiality statutes. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-3005(A)
(2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.4 (1996). Other states have enacted legislation
creating a privilege for communications to such counselors. See, e.g., LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 37:3390.4 (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:2D-11 (West 2004); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 44-53-140 (2002). Information in this note is adapted from Phyllis Coleman,
[Vol. 86, 1
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III
IDENTIFYING THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AT ISSUE
In assessing whether a defendant should have access to
otherwise-privileged communications, four provisions of the
United States Constitution must be considered: the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth26 and Fourteenth Amendments , and the
Confrontation Clause and Compulsory Process Clause of the
28Sixth Amendment.
A. Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
A defense attorney will seek access to a prosecution witness's
therapy or counseling records in the hope of finding information
with which to cross-examine and impeach the witness. The right
to do this is guaranteed to the defendant by the Confrontation
Clause.
Davis v. Alaska29 is the Supreme Court's leading decision on
the scope of cross-examination under the Confrontation Clause,
and therefore merits discussion here, even though it does not
involve a witness's psychiatric or counseling records. Davis was
charged in connection with a safe that had been stolen from a
bar.30 Green, a sixteen-year-old, testified that (a few hours after
the safe was stolen) he saw and spoke to Davis in the immediate
vicinity of where the stolen safe was subsequently found.3' At
Privilege and Confidentiality in 12-Step Self-Help Programs: Believing the Promises
Could Be Hazardous to an Addict's Freedom, 26 J. LEGAL MED. 435,463 (2005).
26 The Fifth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: "No person shall be ...
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
27 Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: "No state
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law ... U .S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
28 The Sixth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend.
VI.
29 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
30 Id. at 309.
31 Id. at 310. Green initially identified Davis in a photo lineup. Id. He also
described Davis's car. Id. When police searched Davis's rental car, which matched
Green's description, they found paint chips in the trunk matching the paint on the
safe. Id.
2007]
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the time, Green was on probation from a juvenile-court
adjudication for delinquency for burglarizing two cabins and was• 32
still on probation during Davis's trial. Davis's attorney sought
to cross-examine Green about whether Green might have hastily
identified the defendant when the police first interviewed him
for fear of jeopardizing his probation or of being accused
himself.33 The trial court, relying on an Alaska statute protecting
the confidentiality of juvenile-court adjudications, refused to
allow any reference to Green's adjudication or probation.4
The Supreme Court, per Chief Justice Burger, reversed
Davis's conviction.3 ' The Sixth Amendment right to confront
one's accuser, the Court emphasized, included the right to cross-
examine the prosecution's witness in an attempt to prove his
36prejudice or bias. Although defense counsel had been
permitted at trial to ask Green whether he feared that the police
might suspect him, counsel had not been permitted to bring out
the underlying reason why Green might feel that way.37 This,
the Court held, prevented the defense from exposing the jury to
information it needed to make a properly informed decision
regarding the credibility of the witness's testimony.38 While
acknowledging the State's legitimate interest in protecting the
anonymity of juvenile offenders, the Court held this interest
"cannot require yielding of so vital a constitutional right as the
effective cross-examination for bias of an adverse witness.,
39
The analogy between Davis and the subject of this Article is
clear enough: in Davis, a statute, enacted to reflect a legitimate
public policy to prevent disclosure of embarrassing information
(which in a sense categorized the information as privileged), had
32 Id. at 310-11.
33 Id. at 311.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 320-21.
36 Id. at 315. Chief Justice Burger wrote that "[c]onfrontation means more than
being allowed to confront the witness physically. 'Our cases construing the
[confrontation] clause hold that a primary interest secured by it is the right of cross-
examination."' ld. (quoting Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965)
(alteration in original)).
37 Id. at 318.
38 Id. at 317.
39 Id. at 320. Justices White and Rehnquist, dissenting, argued that the trial
court's decision was a typical and proper exercise of discretion over cross-
examination. Id. at 321 (White, J., dissenting).
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to give way to permit a defendant to accuse a state witness of
bias and motive to lie, even though there was no direct evidence
that the witness had lied or that the information in fact
motivated him to do so. If a defendant's Confrontation Clause
rights are strong enough to trump Alaska's juvenile-adjudication
"privilege" where the information supported at best a
speculative argument of bias, does it not follow that a
defendant's Confrontation Clause rights also are strong enough
to trump state statutory or common law privileges protecting a
witness's mental-health or rape counseling records, when
information in those records might support a defense argument
that the witness is delusional or lying?
This analogy may be clear, but is not necessarily apt, for at
least two reasons. First, Davis involved a defendant's rights at
trial to disclose information already in the defendant's
possession. By contrast, most of the litigation discussed in this
Article involves whether a defendant is entitled to obtain pretrial
or midtrial discovery of information about which, often, defense
counsel lacks specific knowledge. Second, society's interest in
protecting the confidentiality of communications between aS• 41
patient and a mental-health practitioner, or between a child
42
abuse victim and a counselor, or between a rape victim and a
counselor, 43 or between a domestic-abuse victim and a
counselor,44 is far more substantial than its interest in keeping a
juvenile's adjudications secret.
But if the analogy did hold, then it would be difficult to justify
constraints on a defendant's access to a complainant's counseling
records.45
40 Indeed, circumstantial evidence strongly corroborated Green's testimony. See
supra note 31.
41 See generally 5 CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, JONES ON
EVIDENCE § 47:1-2 (7th ed. 1992 & Supp. 2006).
42 See id. § 47:4B.
43 See id. § 47:5.
44 See id. § 47:6.
45 Another analogy also may be worth considering. Courts recognize that in sex-
offense prosecutions, evidence of the complainant's prior sexual behavior that
otherwise would be excluded by rape-shield legislation nevertheless should be
admitted where such evidence is relevant to suggest that the complainant falsely
accused the defendant to deny infidelity, see 3 FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note
41, § 19:35, deflect a prosecution for prostitution, see id. § 19:36, or protect a
reputation for chastity or heterosexuality, see id. § 19:37. In addition, courts
recognize that such evidence should be admitted where complainant falsely accused
2007]
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B. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie
In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,46 a defendant accused of sexually
abusing his teenage daughter sought to discover the records of
the state Children and Youth Services (CYS) agency relating to
the child, arguing that he was entitled to the information because
the file might contain the names of favorable witnesses and
other, unspecified exculpatory evidence.47 The statute creating
the agency directed that its records were generally privileged but
provided that the agency must disclose the information when
directed to do so by court order.48 The trial judge refused to
order disclosure of the records to the defendant and, further,
refused to examine the records in camera to determine what, if
anything, should be disclosed to defendant.49 Defendant was
convicted, and appealed. The state supreme court held that by
denying access to the CYS file, the trial court order had violated
both the Confrontation and the Compulsory Process Clauses of
the Sixth Amendment, because, without the CYS material,
defense counsel could not effectively question the defendant's
daughter and best expose the weaknesses in her testimony.0 It
remanded for a hearing to determine if a new trial was
necessary, and directed that, at the hearing, defense counsel was
entitled to review the entire file for any useful evidence. 5' The
State appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court agreed that further proceedings were
necessary to determine if the defendant's rights had been
violated, but did not produce a clear majority as to the right in
• 52
question. One reason it could not do so is that two Justices,
Stevens and Scalia, refused to consider the merits of the case,
insisting that the Court should not have heard the case at all;
they argued the ruling below was not a final judgment, and
therefore the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction over the
defendant out of vengeance or spite, see id. § 19:38-39, or in the aftermath of an
episode involving sex and drugs, see id. § 19:40.
46 480 U.S. 39 (1987) (plurality opinion).
47 Id. at 44.
48 Id. at 43-44.
49 See id. at 44.
50 See id. at 46.
51 See id.
52 Id. at 61.
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matter.5 3 (It is perhaps worth noting that Justices Stevens and
Scalia are the only Justices who are still on the Court.) The
seven Justices who considered the merits divided widely on the
theories and issues presented.
1. Confrontation Clause
Justice Powell's plurality opinion (in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White and O'Connor joined) rejected the
theory that the Confrontation Clause was a constitutionally
compelled rule of pretrial discovery. The pluralty insisted the
right to confront one's accusers, guaranteed by the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments is a trial right, guaranteeing an
opportunity for effective cross-examination-not cross-
examination that is effective in whatever way and to whatever
extent the defense might wish 5
Justice Blackmun disagreed with the plurality's assertion in
Ritchie that the Confrontation Clause had no impact on pretrial
discovery, but concurred in the result because he agreed that an
in camera examination of the records would suffice to assure
compliance with the Confrontation Clause. 6 Justice Brennan,
writing also for Justice Marshall, dissented, insisting that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court had correctly concluded that the
case implicated the Confrontation Clause, and that the only
appropriate remedy was disclosure of the records to defense
counsel. Justice Brennan reasoned that only counsel, not a
judge, had sufficient knowledge of the facts and the theory of the
defense to adequately evaluate the material in the records.57
Thus, three Justices argued that the Confrontation Clause
does apply to the situation; four concluded that it does not.
2. Due Process
The plurality concluded that the trial judge's refusal to
conduct an in camera examination of the records constituted a
53 Id. at 78 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan and Marshall joined in the
dissent but also dissented on the merits from the plurality opinion. Id. at 66
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
54 Id. at 52.
55 See id. at 51-55.
56 Id. at 61-66 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
57 Id. at 66-72 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
20071
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denial of defendant's due process right to exculpatory evidence
in possession of the state.58 Consistent with its decisions
applying that due process right,59 the plurality rejected the
proposition that the defense should have access to the
documents to make its own determination of relevance:
To allow full disclosure to defense counsel in this type of
case would sacrifice unnecessarily the Commonwealth's
compelling interest in protecting [privileged] information.
. . . Neither precedent nor common sense requires such a
result .... An in camera review by the trial court will serve
Ritchie's interest without destroying the 60Commonwealth's
need to protect the [privileged information] .
The plurality expressed confidence that an in camera review
could adequately protect the defendant's rights. It emphasized:
"[T]he trial court's discretion is not unbounded. If a defendant
is aware of specific information contained in the file (e.g., the
medical report), he is free to request it directly from the court,
and argue in favor of its materiality."61
Moreover, the plurality stressed, the trial judge's in camera
inspection was not a one-time-only proposition; rather, "the duty
to disclose is ongoing; information that may be deemed
immaterial upon original examination may become important as
the proceedings progress, and the court would be obligated to
release information material to the fairness of the trial.,
62
The Court therefore remanded the case for an in camera
examination of the records by the trial court to determine
whether the files contained information that was "material" to
63the defense of the accused. The Court explicitly "express[ed]
no opinion on whether the result in this case would have been
different if the statute had protected the CYS files from
58 Id. at 58 (plurality opinion). See infra Part IV.B (discussing application of
Ritchie to records and communications in the possession of private entities).
59 See infra note 70 (brief summary of these cases).
60 Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 60-61.
61 Id. at 60.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 58; see infra Part III.B.4 (discussing the Court's definition of
"materiality"). For reasons described later, this Article proposes a standard
different from the materiality standard adopted in Ritchie. See infra Part V.C.1.
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disclosure to anyone, including law-enforcement and judicial
personnel [i.e., if the privilege had been absolute]."6
3. Compulsory Process Clause
The Court declined to discuss whether the case implicated
Ritchie's rights under the Sixth Amendment's Compulsory
Process Clause.65  The plurality acknowledged that the
Compulsory Process Clause might, by implication, involve
discovery, but concluded that there was no need to address the
issue: "Because the applicability of the Sixth Amendment to this
type of case is unsettled, and because our Fourteenth
Amendment precedents addressing the fundamental fairness of
trials establish a clear framework for review, we adopt a due
process analysis for purposes of this case." 66 Significantly, the
plurality elaborated:
Although we conclude that compulsory process provides no
greater protections in this area than those afforded by due
process, we need not decide today whether and how the
guarantees of the Compulsory Process Clause differ from those
of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is enough to conclude that
on these facts, Ritchie's claims more properly are considered
by reference to due process.67
This language suggests the possibility that the Compulsory
Process Clause might provide fewer "protections in this area
than those afforded by due process," a possibility that may be
quite significant in cases where the records are not generated or
possessed by a state agency, in which case the due process
precedents that the Court relied on would not apply.
68
4. "Materiality"
In remanding for an in camera examination by the trial court
to determine whether the files contained information that was
material to the defense, the Court defined "material" as follows:
"Evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability
64 Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 57 n.14; see infra Part IV.A (discussing case law regarding
the application of Ritchie to an absolute privilege).
65 See Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 56.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 See infra Part IV.B (discussing defense access to such records).
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that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result
of the proceeding would have been different. A 'reasonable
probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome., 69 It derived this definition from its prior decisions
regarding a prosecutor's obligation to disclose exculpatory
evidence that was already in the possession of the government.
7°
This is obviously a more restrictive test than that articulated in
71Davis v. Alaska, which held that, despite a state statute akin to
a privilege that bans the use of such evidence, the Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause entitles a defendant to
introduce evidence at trial, so long as that evidence supports a
defense argument that a state witness has a motive to lie or shade
his or her testimony.72 It may appear from this discussion that a
defendant may have a greater right to introduce certain types of
evidence than he or she has to discover such evidence. But this
is not perhaps as strange as it may seem at first glance, because
the privileges under discussion in this Article generally are
regarded as far more important, and therefore as deserving
much-greater protection, than the state policy at stake in Davis.
5. Summary
Thus, Ritchie resolved only two issues:
(1) The four-Justice plurality concluded that well-established
due process principles, requiring the State to disclose any
exculpatory material it possessed, applied to otherwise-
privileged information in a witness's mental-health records
maintained by a state agency, at least when the privilege is
qualified rather than absolute. Presumably the three Justices
who argued that the Confrontation Clause should apply would
have voted for the plurality's due process in camera procedure if
69 Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 57 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682
(1985)).
70 See id. (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)) (defining
"materiality" in assessing whether a failure to disclose information provides a basis
to set aside a conviction); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) (holding that
the prosecutor's fulfillment of its obligations under Brady is measured in part by the
degree of specificity with which the defendant seeks disclosure of exculpatory
information); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (enunciating the
prosecutor's obligation to make timely disclosure to the defense of all exculpatory
evidence).
71 415 U.S. 308 (1974); see also supra Part III.A.
72 See supra text accompanying note 39.
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the alternative had been no disclosure or review at all. Thus,
where the records are possessed by a state agency and they are
protected by a qualified and not an absolute privilege, a
defendant's right to due process disclosure via in camera review
appears to be firmly established.
(2) A majority held that at the postconviction stage, it suffices
that the trial court conduct an in camera review of the state
witness's mental health records; direct disclosure to defenseS 73
counsel is not required.
Ritchie therefore did not resolve any of the issues listed above.
Nearly two decades later, few if any of these issues have been
resolved.
IV
"ABSOLUTE" PRIVILEGES; PRIVATE AGENCIES AND RECORDS
The privilege at issue in Ritchie was a qualified privilege, i.e.,
on its terms it recognized that a court had the authority to order
disclosure of the records in question. The Court pointedly
"express[ed] no opinion" as to the outcome "if the statute had
protected the [government agency's] files from disclosure to
anyone, including law-enforcement and judicial personnel., 74
Moreover, because the records in question were maintained by
and in the possession of a state agency, the plurality based its
decision on the State's due process obligation to provide the
defense with exculpatory information in its possession.75 Thus,
Ritchie provides no guidance as to private records.
We now examine how lower courts have attempted to apply
Ritchie in such situations.
A. "Absolute" Privilege
Lower federal and state courts have had to resolve the conflict
between a defendant's right to obtain exculpatory information
73 This majority consisted of the four-Justice plurality, and Justice Blackmun,
who concurred in the result. The plurality concluded that only Ritchie's right to
due process was at stake; Justice Blackmun concluded that the situation implicated
Ritchie's Confrontation Clause right, but that an in camera review, rather than full
disclosure of the records to the defendant, sufficed to protect his Confrontation
Clause right. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 39, 61.
74 Id. at 57 n.14; see also infra Part IV.A.
75 See Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 56-60; see also infra Part IV.B.
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and a statutory privilege that on its face is absolute. Four
different approaches have emerged.
1. If Witness Asserts "Absolute" Privilege, Her Testimony Is
Stricken
Where a defendant has established a constitutional right to
the disclosure of privileged information, but the statutory
privilege is absolute on its face, some courts have held that the
witness retains the privilege: a court cannot disclose unless the
witness waives the privilege. Absent such a waiver, if the
defendant adequately demonstrates the need for an in camera
review or disclosure of the records,76 the witness is precluded
from testifying. If he or she has already testified, his or her
testimony is stricken from the record.
States following this approach include Connecticut,77
78 79 80 . 8Michigan, 8 Nebraska, 9 New Mexico, Wisconsin,"' and SouthDakota.82
76 See infra Parts V.B-C (discussing current law and providing recommendations
for a proposed standard for obtaining in camera review and, in appropriate
circumstances, disclosure of records).
77 State v. Peeler, 857 A.2d 808, 841 (Conn. 2004) (quoting State v. Slimskey, 779
A.2d 723, 730-31 (Conn. 2001)); State v. Bruno, 673 A.2d 1117, 1124 (Conn. 1996);
State v. Whitaker, 520 A.2d 1018, 1025 (Conn. 1987); State v. Esposito, 471 A.2d
949, 956 (Conn. 1984). Connecticut's procedure is particularly elaborate. A
defendant may subpoena witnesses to testify at a closed-courtroom hearing to
attempt to make the required showing. See Peeler, 857 A.2d at 841. If defendant
succeeds, and the witness refuses to waive the privilege, the witness's testimony is
banned (or stricken). Id. The witness may waive the privilege for the limited
purpose of permitting the court to make an in camera inspection of the records. See
id. If the court concludes that information in the records must be disclosed to
protect the defendant's confrontation rights under the state constitution, the witness
again has the option of permitting disclosure by waiving the privilege as to those
entries in the records that the trial judge believes must be disclosed, or of asserting
the privilege, in which case he or she cannot testify (or the testimony must be
stricken). See id. at 841-42.
78 Michigan's statutes expressly provided that confidential communications made
to a sexual- or domestic-assault counselor "shall not be admissible as evidence in
any civil or criminal proceeding without the prior written consent of the victim."
MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 600.2157a(2) (West 2000); see also People v. Stanaway,
521 N.W.2d 557 (Mich. 1994).
79 State v. Trammell, 435 N.W.2d 197, 201 (Neb. 1989) (physical assault and rape
of a forty-year-old woman; adopting the Connecticut procedure established in
Esposito, 471 A.2d 949); see also State v. Kinser, 609 N.W.2d 322, 325-26 (Neb.
2000).
80 See State v. Gonzales, 1996-NMCA-026, 16-17, 121 N.M. 421, 912 P.2d 297.
The court upheld dismissal of rape charges because the complainant, acting at the
[Vol. 86, 1
Access to Psychotherapy or Counseling Records
2. No In Camera Review, No Disclosure; Witness May Testify
At least a few state courts have held that, where a privilege is
absolute, the defendant simply has no right to access the records,
nor to trigger an in camera review, because even an in camera
review would intrude upon the confidentiality of the records.
8 3
prosecutor's direction, refused to sign a waiver authorizing submission of the
records to the court, even though earlier she had signed a waiver releasing those
records to the police and prosecutor-although the prosecutor insisted that no one
in that office ever received or looked at the records. Id.
81 See State v. Shiffra, 499 N.W.2d 719, 724-25 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993), modified on
other grounds, State v. Green, 2002 WI App. 68, 253 Wis. 2d 356, 646 N.W.2d 298.
In Shiffra, the court upheld a pretrial order suppressing the sexual-assault
complainant's testimony after the trial court found that the defendant had made a
satisfactory preliminary finding of materiality and complainant refused to waive the
privilege to permit an in camera inspection. Shiffra, 499 N.W.2d at 724-25.
82 See State v. Karlen, 589 N.W.2d 594, 601 (S.D. 1999).
83 Colorado's Supreme Court has addressed the issue twice. People v. District
Court of Denver, 719 P.2d 722 (Colo. 1986) (decided prior to Ritchie), involved a
defendant's attempt to obtain the records of a sexual-assault complainant's
postassault psychological counseling. See id. In People v. Turner, 109 P.3d 639
(Colo. 2005), the defendant in a domestic-abuse case sought records of the
complainant's counseling with a domestic-violence victim advocate center. Id. In
both decisions the court held that the privilege was absolute and that the witness
could testify. See id. at 647; Dist. Ct. of Denver, 719 P.2d at 727. Turner relied
heavily on the fact that the privilege at issue was absolute, in contrast to the one at
issue in Ritchie. In both Turner and District Court of Denver, the court stressed that
the defendant did not make any specific factual showing that the records likely
would contain significant impeachment material; rather, each defendant merely
alleged that the records might reveal statements inconsistent with the witness's
likely trial testimony. Thus, although the court in each case rejected a balancing
test, it has not yet faced a case where a defendant makes a specific factual showing
that denial of at least an in camera review would undermine his rights to
confrontation, compulsory process, or a fair trial.
An intermediate appellate court in Illinois has adopted a similar approach. See
People v. Harlacher, 634 N.E.2d 366, 372 (I11. App. Ct. 1994) (discussing Family
Advocate records).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court read Ritchie as permitting a state to create an
absolute privilege without negative repercussions. See Commonwealth v. Wilson,
602 A.2d 1290, 1297-98 (Pa. 1992). The court held that where the statutory
privilege is absolute in its terms, the defendant is not entitled to any form of
discovery or in camera review; nor, apparently, is the complainant's testimony
subject to exclusion. See id. Neither defendant in the two unrelated cases joined
for appeal in Wilson made any specific showing, each merely claiming a right to
access to the records to see if they contained any impeaching material; but the
opinion in its terms does not rely on the inadequacy of the defendants' showing to
justify an absolute ban on access or in camera review. See id. at 1294-98. Although
the case involves records of (and testimony by) rape counselors, dictum in the
decision applies to statements protected by an equally broad and unequivocal
psychotherapist-patient privilege. See id. at 1295. But see Commonwealth v. Davis,
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Two federal court decisions also appear to lean in this
direction. 84 One federal district court judge likened the situation
to one where:
[A] co-defendant in a criminal case [makes] a deal with the
Government and testif[ies] against the remaining defendants.
The co-defendant is himself represented by counsel. Can
anyone imagine the court granting a motion by the defendants
to examine the cooperating defendant's attorney in camera
regarding the privileged statements made to him to determine
if any could be helpful to the defense?
85
Indeed, few lawyers could imagine a court granting such a
motion.
But this does not compel giving equal weight to the privileges
discussed in this Article. The law values the attorney-client
privilege so highly because our entire adversarial system of
criminal justice depends on the sanctity of that privilege; breach
it, and there is a substantial risk that the entire system will crash,
674 A.2d 214 (Pa. 1996) (holding that where the complainant consents to allow the
Commonwealth access to records of her sexual-assault counseling, the defendant
must receive equal access); Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 642 A.2d 1132, 1135-36 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1994) (holding that where the State improperly called and elicited
testimony from the complainant's counselor without the complainant's permission,
it was reversible error to deny the defendant equal access).
84 See United States v. Doyle, 1 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1189-91 (D. Ore. 1998) (holding
that a defendant has no right to an in camera review of the mental-health records of
a victim when the government sought an upward departure at a sentencing hearing
for the victim's extreme psychological injury); see also Newton v. Kemna, 354 F.3d
776, 785 (8th Cir. 2004) (no abuse of discretion in a habeas proceeding when the
trial court denied discovery and in camera review of psychiatric records).
Newton held that a petitioner was not entitled to habeas relief from a state
conviction because Ritchie did not clearly establish a Confrontation Clause right to
access to a witness's records: "[W]e may grant relief only if the state court has
decided a matter contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent or has
unreasonably applied that precedent." Id. at 781 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)
(2000)) (sets the standard for habeas relief from a state conviction). The court
concluded that the Supreme Court, in Ritchie, had not "clearly established" the
defendant's right to relief. See id. at 784-85. First, Newton's habeas petition was
founded on the Confrontation Clause, but of the seven Justices who considered the
issue in Ritchie, four rejected a claim that the clause afforded discovery to a
defendant. Id. Second, the privilege at issue in Ritchie was a qualified privilege for
rape-counseling records, not, as in Newton, an absolute privilege for psychiatric
records. See id.
85 Doyle, 1 F. Supp. 2d at 1191.
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or at least will produce verdicts of guilt far less reliable than we
now take for granted.86
3. The Ritchie Approach Prevails Even if the Privilege Is
"Absolute"
By contrast, a number of courts have held that a trial judge
can, and in appropriate cases must, conduct an in camera
inspection of the records, despite the apparently absolute nature
817
of a privilege. These courts conclude that the defendant's
86 1 concede that a critic might plausibly argue that this is no more than a
"profession-centric" way of saying: "The legal profession makes this distinction
between the attorney-client and all other privileges because we have the power to
do so."
87 United States v. Mazzola, 217 F.R.D. 84, 88 (D. Mass. 2003). The judge further
concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty provided,
at best, only "qualified," not absolute privacy protection, and that the defendants'
legitimate need for the information outweighed the witness's privacy interest. Id.
In United States v. Alperin, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1251 (N.D. Cal. 2001), the court
concluded, in a prosecution for assaulting a federal agent, that the defendant was
entitled to in camera review of the complainant's mental health records. Id. at 1255.
Curiously, the court commented that "[n]o circuit court has addressed this issue
following [Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996), in which the Supreme Court
recognized a federal patient-psychotherapist privilege]." Id. at 1253. The U.S.
Magistrate Judge made no mention of United States v. Hatch, 162 F.3d 937, 947 (7th
Cir. 1998).
In United States v. Hansen, 955 F. Supp. 1225 (D. Mont. 1997), a district court
held that a murder defendant was entitled to disclosure of the deceased's
psychiatric-treatment records, because "[tihe mental and emotional condition of the
deceased is a central element" of defendant's self-defense claim. Id. at 1226. The
court reasoned:
The holder of the privilege has little private interest in preventing
disclosure, because he is dead. The public does have an interest in
preventing disclosure, since persons in need of therapy may be less likely to
seek help if they fear their most personal thoughts will be revealed, even
after their death. However, I find that the defendant's need for the
privileged material outweighs this interest.
Id. (citing Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10-11). The year after Hansen was decided, however,
the Supreme Court, in Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998), held
that the attorney-client privilege survives the death of the client. Id. at 410-11. The
Court reasoned that clients frequently tell their attorneys highly personal
information that attorneys need to help the clients structure their legal affairs,
including information that the clients would not want divulged even after their
death. See id. at 407-08. For a fuller discussion of Swidler, see 5 FISHMAN &
MCKENNA, supra note 41, § 45:5. Presumably this is at least as likely with regard to
statements made to a psychotherapist or other counselor.
Several states and a federal court in Massachusetts have leaned toward this
approach as well. See United States v. Lowe, 948 F. Supp. 97 (D. Mass. 1996)
(employing the in camera procedure where the complainant agreed to a limited
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constitutional rights must prevail over the privilege. 88 Two pre-
Jaffe federal circuit court opinions also support allowing in
camera review when a defendant makes an adequate showing of
need. 9
waiver of the privilege for that purpose); People v. Hammon, 938 P.2d 986, 993
(Cal. 1997); Lucas v. State, 555 S.E.2d 440, 446 (Ga. 2001) (no error to deny
disclosure of codefendant's psychiatric- and psychological-counseling records);
Herendeen v. State, 601 S.E.2d 372, 374 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (Herendeen was a
psychologist whose records were subpoenaed, not a defendant); State v. Peseti, 65
P.3d 119, 133-34 (Haw. 2003); Commonwealth v. Barroso, 122 S.W.3d 554, 563 (Ky.
2003); State v. Hummel, 483 N.W.2d 68, 71 (Minn. 1992) ("'[T]he medical privilege,
like other privileges, sometimes must give way to the defendant's right to confront
his accusers."' (quoting State v. Kutchara, 350 N.W.2d 924, 926 (Minn. 1984));
Missouri ex rel. White v. Gray, 141 S.W.3d 460, 466-67 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004); State v.
Duffy, 2000 MT 186 9Ij1 23-24, 300 Mont. 381, 388, T j 23-24, 6 P.3d 453, 459; State
v. Donnelly, 798 P.2d 89, 92 (Mont. 1990), overruled on other grounds by State v.
Imlay, 813 P.2d 979 (Mont. 1991); State v. J.G., 619 A.2d 232, 237 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1993) ("We hold that in the absence of compelling circumstances,
communications between a crime victim and a counselor consulted for treatment
are absolutely immune from disclosure."); People v. Bridgeland, 796 N.Y.S.2d 768,
771-72 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005); Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives,
469 A.2d 1161, 1166 (R.I. 1983) (creation of an absolute evidentiary privilege would
violate the defendant's constitutional rights to confrontation and compulsory
process); State v. Gonzales, 1996-NMCA-026, 91 20-21, 121 NM 421, 426-27, 912
P.2d 297 (upholding dismissal of rape charges because the complainant, acting at
the prosecutor's direction, refused to sign a waiver authorizing submission of the.
records to the court, even though earlier she had signed a waiver releasing those
records to the police and prosecutor; the prosecutor insisted that no one in that
office ever received or looked at the records.).
88 See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
89 In Doe v. Diamond, 964 F.2d 1325 (2d Cir. 1992), the Second Circuit upheld a
trial court's order holding a government witness (the complainant in an extortion
case) in contempt for refusing to answer questions about his psychiatric history
during a pretrial in camera hearing. Id. at 1326. The court reasoned that in view of
the witness's importance and the effect of his psychiatric history on his credibility,
preclusion of the inquiry because of the privilege would violate the Confrontation
Clause. Id. at 1328-29. "[T]he balance in this case weighs overwhelmingly in favor
of allowing an inquiry into his history of mental illness." Id. at 1329.
In United States v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154 (11th Cir. 1983), a decision that
preceded both Jaffe and Ritchie, the Eleventh Circuit held that the trial court erred
in denying the defendants access to a key government witness's records, which
apparently revealed that the witness suffered from, and had been treated and
confined for, paranoia. Id. at 1156-57. Because paranoia often skews a person's
perception of reality and may trigger an obsession to avenge imagined wrongs, the
court reasoned, the trial court had denied the defendants the right to adequately
confront and cross-examine this witness. Id. at 1160-63.
Neither Doe nor Lindstrom is in direct and flagrant contradiction of Jaffee or
Ritchie, but their continued validity is open to some question.
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4. Defense Counsel May Inspect Records Under Strict Conditions
Regarding Disclosure
In Commonwealth v. Dwyer,' Massachusetts's highest court
held that, upon an adequate showing of need, the trial court
must permit defense counsel to examine the materials under
carefully controlled conditions and circumstances, but that
counsel may not disclose or use the information he or she learns
unless explicitly authorized to do so by the trial judge.9'
5. Courts Divided, or No Explicit Ruling
In some states, such as Florida, intermediate appellate courts
are divided on the issue.9 In other states, such as Illinois, the
law is too unclear to categorize.93
90 859 N.E.2d 400 (Mass. 2006).
91 See id. at 418-19; see also infra Part V.A.1.
92 State v. Pinder, 678 So. 2d 410 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). The court held that a
defendant could obtain in camera review of a privilege that was absolute on its face.
Id. at 417. Two other Florida state courts have held that because the privilege is
absolute, the defendant has no right even to an in camera inspection of a state
witness's mental-health records. State v. Roberson, 884 So. 2d 976, 980 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2004); State v. Famiglietti, 817 So. 2d 901, 906-08 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2002).
93 Illinois's Supreme Court has sent mixed signals. In People v. Dace, 449 N.E.2d
1031 (Ill. Ct. App. 1983), affd, 470 N.E.2d 993 (Ill. 1984), an intermediate appellate
court held that, even though a statutory psychotherapist-patient privilege was
absolute on its face, the trial judge properly conducted an in camera inspection of
the mental-health records of the state's key witness in a burglary trial, and further
held that the trial judge had erred in refusing to disclose certain material to the
defense. See id. at 1035. On appeal, the state supreme court commented: "The
question is discussed in detail in the opinion of the appellate court and we need not
repeat the discussion here. It suffices to say that we agree with the appellate court
that, under the circumstances shown by the evidence, the refusal to permit the
discovery was reversible error." People v. Dace, 470 N.E.2d 993, 996 (11. 1984)
(citations omitted).
In People v. Foggy, 521 N.E.2d 86 (Ill. 1988), the court concluded that a
defendant's request for an in camera inspection of the rape complainant's
counseling records, which merely asked the judge to review records of her
statements relating to the instant incident to determine whether they contained
information useful for impeachment, with no specific allegations supporting a claim
that such material was likely to be found, was insufficient to trigger an in camera
review. Id. at 91-92. The court did not explicitly rule on the appropriate procedure
if defendant had made an adequate showing and the complainant refused to waive
the privilege, but at least one intermediate appellate court has apparently read
Foggy as holding that the sex-abuse-counseling privilege is absolute. See People v.
Harlacher, 634 N.E.2d 366, 372 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). But since the defendant in
Foggy did not make any specific showing as to why those records should be
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6. Evaluation
Of the four approaches outlined above, the second, denying
all review, is the least satisfying. As Kentucky's Supreme Court
expressed:
The issue ... is not whether [a defendant's] "need" for the
evidence should be balanced against [a witness's] interest in
maintaining the confidentiality of her psychotherapy, but
whether the constitutional rights afforded to a criminal
defendant by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to
[the] United States Constitution [and corresponding provisions
in the state constitution] prevail over a state policy interest
expressed in a statute or rule creating an evidentiary privilege.
As a general proposition, constitutional rights prevail over
conflicting statutes and rules. 94
There is a serious problem with the first approach: precluding
the prosecutor from calling the witness at all, unless the witness
waives the privilege, in essence gives the witness the legal
authority to preclude the prosecution of a dangerous predator.
A legislature has the authority to enact such a law, but to do so
constitutes a profoundly unwise social policy.95  Giving the
witness the right to forbid disclosure, moreover, could often
produce "unworkable or unwieldy" results, as when a witness-
victim has already testified (an instruction to disregard the
testimony is unlikely to "unring the bell"), or when the witness is
a minor, in which case the judge would have to determine who
has the authority to decide for the minor whether or not to waive
the privilege. 96
The third and fourth approaches recognize that neither of the
two conflicting interests, the patient or client's right to
inspected, there still appears to be no clear state law on how such a situation would
be handled if in fact a defendant did make a compelling showing for such records.
94 Commonwealth v. Barroso, 122 S.W.3d 554, 558 (Ky. 2003).
95 "If ... the witness is the victim of the crime without whose testimony the
prosecution could not prove its case, must the case be dismissed if the victim refuses
to waive the privilege? If so, what of 'the fair administration of justice' and the aim
'that guilt shall not escape?"' Id. at 565 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683, 708-09 (1974), in which the Supreme Court held that although the
"presumptive privilege for Presidential communications . . . is fundamental to the
operation of Government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under
the Constitution," sometimes it must yield to a criminal defendant's rights to
confront his accusers and to compulsory process to produce evidence in his own
defense).
96 Id.
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nondisclosure and the defendant's right to a fair trial, should be
given absolute preference over the other. Each requires counsel
to make an adequate showing of need before the possibility of
disclosure arises. Each requires the trial judge's approval before
defense counsel may use or disclose privileged information.
They differ in whether (once a showing of need has been made)
the initial inspection of the records should be performed by the
judge, or by defense counsel. The fourth (Massachusetts)
approach creates too great a risk that the fear of disclosure will
leave a patient or client unwilling or unable to confide fully in his
or her counselor and thereby interfere with the therapeutic
process. 97 The third approach, which authorizes the trial judge
to make the preliminary examination of the records, strikes the
best balance. It protects the public's interest by denying the
witness the legal authority to veto the prosecution, and
adequately protects the defendant's interest in due process.
Lamentably, it may expose intensely personal and private
matters, publicly humiliate the witness, and, in sexual-assault
and child abuse cases, may renew or even magnify the original
harm done by the defendant's conduct. However, allowing the
State to rely on a witness's testimony to convict a defendant of a
crime, yet denying the defendant even an in camera review of
materials that may significantly undermine that witness's
credibility, is a process that is anything but "due": it is
fundamentally unfair and creates too a great a risk that an
innocent defendant may be convicted.
B. Records Held by Private Entities Unaffiliated with the State;
Compulsory Process Clause
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie9 dealt with a government agency's
records. If the records were created by and are possessed by a
private entity, the due process principle on which the Ritchie
plurality relied presumably would not apply; rather, a defendant
would have to rely on the Compulsory Process Clause of the
Sixth Amendment. 99 The Ritchie plurality commented in dictum
that "compulsory process provides no greater protections in this
97 See infra Part V.B.1.
98 480 U.S. 39, 43 (1987).
99 Each of the cases Ritchie cited in support of its due process analysis involved
evidence or information possessed by state agencies. See supra Part III.B.2.
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area than those afforded by due process," but had no cause to
"decide... whether and how the guarantees of the Compulsory
Process Clause differ from those of the Fourteenth
Amendment. '
Courts that have considered the issue are divided. Some
courts apparently have held that a defendant has no Fourteenth
Amendment constitutional right to subpoena a witness's mental-
health or counseling records in such circumstances.1' 1 Several
state courts, applying state law, have held that a defendant does
have the right to attempt to secure an in camera review of
privately held records.'0 2
100 Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 56.
101 See United States v. Hatch, 162 F.3d 937, 946-47 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that
the trial court had not erred in declining to conduct an in camera review of a
government witness's privately held mental-health records).
In United States v. Skorniak, 59 F.3d 750 (8th Cir. 1995) the court appears to have
held that, because the records were not in the government's hands, defendant could
not subpoena them. Id. at 755-56. The court also notes, however, that the trial
judge observed that the records did not contain anything of use to the defendant,
which suggests that the trial court in fact may have conducted an in camera review.
See id. at 756. Note that this case was decided prior to Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S.
1 (1996), in which the Supreme Court recognized, and categorized as "absolute," a
federal patient-psychotherapist privilege. See id. at 17-18; see also State v. Spath,
1998 ND 133, [ 20, 581 N.W.2d 123, 126-27 (noting the distinction between
accessing records held by the government and those not held by the government);
State v. Bassine, 71 P.3d 72, 75-76 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (Federal and Oregon
Constitutions require discovery of materials that are in possession of the
government.).
102 Goldsmith v. State, 651 A.2d 866, 874-75 (Md. 1995) (holding that although
defendant had no constitutional right to pretrial discovery of such records,
defendant had the right to subpoena the witness's psychiatrist at trial).
Massachusetts's highest court went even further, applying state rules of criminal
procedure, and holding that upon an adequate showing of need, defense counsel
must be permitted to inspect a state witness's records prior to trial under carefully
controlled conditions and circumstances. Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 859 N.E.2d
400, 414-423 (Mass. 2006).
Rhode Island's Supreme Court, in an advisory opinion rendered prior to Ritchie,
advised the state legislature that enacting an absolute privilege would violate a
defendant's right to confrontation guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions.
Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives, 469 A.2d 1161 (R.I. 1983).
In State v. Shiffra, 499 N.W.2d 719 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993), abrogated by State v.
Green, 2002 WI App 68, 253 Wis. 2d 356, 646 N.W.2d 298, the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals upheld a pretrial order suppressing the sexual-assault complainant's
testimony after the trial court found that the defendant had made a satisfactory
preliminary finding of materiality and complainant refused to waive the privilege to
permit an in camera inspection. Id. at 724-25. In State v. Green, 2002 WI App 68,
253 Wis. 2d 356, 646 N.W.2d 298, the state supreme court implicitly endorsed the
conclusion that a defendant has a constitutional right to such records upon an
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Although the United States Supreme Court has never
squarely ruled on the issue, Kentucky's Supreme Court, in
Commonwealth v. Barroso,10 3 concluded that a careful review of
United States Supreme Court precedent1" strongly suggests that
adequate showing of need even where the records are not in state possession. See
id. 21 n.4.
The California Supreme Court in People v. Hammon, 938 P.2d 986 (Cal. 1997),
first observed that the facts of the case provided no occasion "to revisit the question
of whether a defendant may generally obtain pretrial discovery of unprivileged
information in the hands of private parties." Id. at 993 (emphasis added). The
court then added: "That the defense may issue subpoenas duces tecum to private
persons is implicit in statutory law and has been clearly recognized by the courts for
at least two decades. However, this more general right provides no basis for
overriding a statutory and constitutional privilege." Id. (citations omitted).
103 122 S.W.3d 554 (Ky. 2003).
104 The court in Barroso summarized its review thus:
[T]o date, the United States Supreme Court has held that the denial of the
right to impeach a prosecution witness violates the Confrontation Clause
[citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974)] but has yet to muster a
majority on whether the denial of pretrial access to impeachment evidence
is also a denial of confrontation rights [citing Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480
U.S. 39 (1987)]. It has declared that evidentiary rules [citing Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973)] and at least one recognized evidentiary
privilege [citing Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957)] must yield to a
criminal defendant's due process right to present a defense. It has also
stated that a defendant's due process right to discover exculpatory
evidence in the possession of the government cannot be defeated by a
qualified privilege [citing Ritchie], and that the "fair administration of
justice" requires that privileged inculpatory evidence in the hands of a third
party be turned over to the prosecution [citing United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683 (1974)]. It has further held that the right to compulsory process
includes the right to elicit favorable testimony from defense witnesses
[citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967)], but has yet to specifically
decide whether that same right prevails over an absolute privilege (though
Washington provides a close analogy).
Id. at 561; see supra Part III (discussion of Ritchie and Davis). In Chambers, the
Court held that a state's rule precluding a party from impeaching its own witness
could not preclude a defendant from offering highly probative evidence of his
innocence. See 2 FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 41, § 13:38; 5 id. § 37:20.
Roviaro held that a defendant has the right to learn the identity of an informer
where a fair trial requires it. See id. § 13:18; see also Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 60-61. In
Nixon, the Supreme Court held that although the "presumptive privilege for
Presidential communications ... is fundamental to the operation of Government
and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution,"
sometimes it must yield to a criminal defendant's rights to confront his accusers and
to compulsory process to produce evidence in his own defense. See Nixon, 418 U.S.
at 708. In Washington, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a state statute
prohibiting accomplices or co-conspirators from testifying on behalf of one another,
reasoning that a criminal defendant's right to compulsory process included not only
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the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment may, in
an appropriate case, require the third party to provide
information to the court for in camera inspection.'05 According
to the court: "If the psychotherapy records of a crucial
prosecution witness contain evidence probative of the witness's
ability to recall, comprehend, and accurately relate the subject
matter of the testimony, the defendant's right to compulsory
process must prevail over the witness's psychotherapist-patientprivilege. '1°
The issue is not an easy one to resolve, but on balance, the
latter view-allowing access-is correct. First, the availability or
extent of legal protection from disclosure should not depend on
the fortuity of whether the witness obtained counseling from a
state agency or a private practitioner or organization,
particularly given that people of modest means may have no
recourse but to rely on a public agency. Second, most
jurisdictions have created significant substantive requirements
and procedural protections to prevent unjustified or excessive
disclosure. 10 7 Thus, this exception to the privilege applies only
where legitimate doubts exist as to a government witness's
testimonial capacity or the truthfulness of a government
witness's testimony. In such a case, to withhold such information
from the jury creates too great a risk that an innocent defendant
may be convicted.
the right to compel attendance of defense witnesses, but also the right to introduce
their testimony into evidence. Washington, 388 U.S. at 23.
To this list of decisions it is appropriate to add Holmes v. South Carolina, 547
U.S. 319 (2006). At his trial for murder, sexual assault, robbery, and burglary,
Holmes sought to offer evidence tending to show that someone else committed the
crime, but the evidence was excluded. Id. at 322-24. The Supreme Court
acknowledged the general validity of the principle that a court may exclude such
evidence if the legitimate probative value of the evidence is outweighed by the risk
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or the potential to mislead the jury, or
the evidence is repetitive or only marginally relevant. Id. at 326. The Court
unanimously held, however, that a South Carolina variation on the doctrine, which
excluded evidence of another's guilt if the State's case was perceived to be
particularly strong, was unconstitutional. Id. at 329-31. Exclusion, the Court
insisted, could only be based on an evaluation of the evidence the defendant
offered, not on the supposed strength of the evidence it was offered to counter. Id.
at 331.
105 See Barroso, 122 S.W.3d at 563.
106 Id. The court also cited decisions by courts from several other states reaching
the same conclusion. See id. at 561-62.
107 See infra Part V.B.
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V
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
A. Overview
In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, the Supreme Court was called
upon to establish the appropriate level of postconviction review108
of the records. A four-to-three plurality of the Court rejected
the concept that the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
entitled a defendant to pretrial discovery; rather, it reasoned, the
Confrontation Clause applies only at trial.'0 9 A five-Justice
majority concluded that, at least in the circumstances in that
case, the defendant was not entitled to examine the records;
instead, an in camera review of the records by the trial judge
sufficed to protect the defendant's right to due process.11
Subsequent to Ritchie, defense attorneys naturally have
sought to obtain the records (or at least an in camera review of
them) in time for the defendant to use the records at trial.
Numerous issues arise.
1. Disclosure to Counsel, or In Camera Review
Justice Brennan, dissenting in Ritchie, argued that that only
defense counsel, who is far more familiar with the facts and the
defense strategy, can effectively evaluate the information."'
Nevertheless, until December 2006, each of the states that
permit any review of privileged records 12 denied defense
counsel the right to review such records. Instead, the law in each
such state was that if a defendant made an adequate preliminary
showing, the trial court would have to conduct an in camera
inspection of the kind approved in Ritchie."
3
108 See 480 U.S. 39 (1987).
109 See id. at 998-1000; see generally supra Part III.A.
110 Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 58, 61. Justice Blackmun, concurring in the result,
provided the fifth vote for the in camera procedure. See also supra Part III.B.2-3.
111 See supra Part II1.B.1.
112 Recall that some states permit no review whatsoever of records protected by
an absolute privilege, unless the witness waives the privilege. See supra Parts
IV.A.1-2.
113 Each state court opinion I have read that discusses the issue so holds. See,
e.g., People v. Gurule, 51 P.3d 224, 249 (Cal. 2002); People v. Hammon, 938 P.2d
986, 993 (Cal. 1997); State v. Peeler, 857 A.2d 808, 841 (Conn. 2004); State v.
Slimskey, 779 A.2d 723, 732 (Conn. 2001); State v. Bruno, 673 A.2d 1117, 1124 n.11
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In December of 2006, however, in Commonwealth v. Dwyer,"'
Massachusetts's highest court abrogated its prior decisions on
the subject,"-' and held that once a defendant makes a sufficient
showing of need," 6 defense counsel, not the judge, should make
the preliminary examination of the witness's records. 117 The
court explained:
Experience has . . . confirmed that trial judges cannot
effectively assume the role of advocate when examining
records. Requiring judges to take on the perspective of an
advocate is contrary to the judge's proper role as a neutral
arbiter. Despite their best intentions and dedication, trial
judges examining records before a trial lack complete
information about the facts of a case or a defense to an
(Conn. 1996); State v. Pinder, 678 So. 2d 410, 417 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); State v.
Peseti, 65 P.3d 119, 131-33 (Haw. 2003); Goldsmith v. State, 651 A.2d 866 (Md.
1995); People v. Stanaway, 521 N.W.2d 557, 574 (Mich. 1994); Cox v. State, 2001-
KA-01427-SCT ($1 52-54) (Miss. 2003); State v. Taylor, 134 S.W.3d 21, 26 (Mo.
2004) (en banc); State v. Hoag, 749 A.2d 331, 333 (N.H. 2000); State v. Gagne, 612
A.2d 899, 901 (N.H. 1992); State v. L.J.P., 637 A.2d 532, 537-38 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1994); People v. Buchholz, 805 N.Y.S.2d 763, 765 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005);
State v. Black, 621 N.E.2d 484, 488 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); State v. Bassine, 71 P.3d
72, 75-76 (Or. Ct. App. 2003); Dixon v. State, 923 S.W.2d 161, 166-67 (Tex. App.
1996), vacated on other grounds, 928 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), on
remand, 955 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. App. 1997), aff'd, 2 S.W.3d 263 (Tex. Crim. App.
1999); State v. Cramer, 2002 UT 9, $1 18-24, 44 P.3d 690, 695-96; State v.
Kalakosky, 852 P.2d 1064, 1076-77 (Wash. 1993); State v. Diemel, 914 P.2d 779, 781
(Wash. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Green, 2002 WI App. 68, 1 34-35, 253 Wis. 2d 356,
$ 34-35, 646 N.W.2d 298, $$ 34-35.
114 859 N.E.2d 400 (Mass. 2006).
115 Commonwealth v. Fuller, 667 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 1996), abrogated by
Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 859 N.E.2d 400 (Mass. 2006); Commonwealth v. Bishop,
617 N.E.2d 990 (Mass. 1993).
116 See infra Part V.B.1.
117 See Dwyer, 859 N.E.2d at 418-19. The court primarily relied upon MASS. R.
CRIM. P. 17(a)(2). See Dwyer, 859 N.E.2d at 414. Rule 17, entitled "Summonses for
Witnesses," provides:
(2) For Production of Documentary Evidence and of Objects. A summons
may... command the person to whom it is directed to produce the books,
papers, documents, or other objects designated therein. The court on
motion may quash or modify the summons if compliance would be
unreasonable or oppressive or if the summons is being used to subvert the
provisions of Rule 14. The court may direct that books, papers,
documents, or objects designated in the summons be produced before the
court within a reasonable time prior to the trial or prior to the time when
they are to be offered in evidence and may upon their production permit
the books, papers, documents, objects, or portions thereof to be inspected
and copied by the parties and their attorneys if authorized by law.
MASS. R. CRIM. P. 17(a)(2).
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indictment, and are all too often unable to recognize the
significance, or insignificance, of a particular document to a
defense.!
18
The court cited no studies or other authority to document that
experience has shown that trial judges cannot adequately
conduct the preliminary review."' Nor did it discuss, or even
cite, any of the numerous court decisions in other jurisdictions
that have held to the contrary.
In an appendix to its opinion, the court in Dwyer established
specific, detailed, and elaborate procedures designed to protect
against improper disclosure of presumptively privileged
records.'20  Initially, only defense counsel may inspect the
records. 12 "Before conducting any such inspection, counsel shall
sign, as an officer of the court, and file a protective order
containing stringent nondisclosure provisions.' ' 22  In the
protective order, the court must "prohibit counsel from copying
any record or disclosing or disseminating the contents of any
record to any person, including the defendant."'1 23 Information
contained in the records may be copied or disclosed to the
defendant or another person (such as an investigator) "if, and
only if, a judge subsequently allows a motion for a specific, need-
118 Dwyer, 859 N.E.2d at 418 (citations omitted). The court cited, after the
second sentence, Commonwealth v. Stockhammer, 570 N.E.2d 992, 1001 (1991), and
quoted in a parenthetical: "In our adversary system, it is enough for judges to
judge. The determination of what may be useful to the defense can properly and
effectively be made only by an advocate." Dwyer, 859 N.E.2d at 418 (quoting
Stockhammer, 570 N.E.2d at 1001) (language originally from Dennis v. United
States, 384 U.S. 855, 875 (1966)).
119 The court added: "The absence of an advocate's eye may have resulted in
overproduction, as well as underproduction, of privileged records, and has
repeatedly contributed to trial delays and appeals, jeopardizing the rights of
defendants, complainants, and the public." Dwyer, 859 N.E.2d at 418. The court
cited no authority to substantiate these statements.
120 Id. app. The court first set out procedures to follow in determining whether
the records were privileged and defense counsel's access to them if the trial court
concluded that they were not privileged. Id. app. at 420-21; see infra Part V.A.3.
Once the trial judge determines that the records are presumptively privileged, the
Dwyer Appendix specifies where the records are to be kept and how they are to be
marked. See Dwyer, 895 N.E.2d 400 app. at 421.
121 Dwyer, 859 N.E.2d at 419.
122 Id.
123 Id. Judges and counsel are required to report any violation of a protective
order to the Board of Bar Overseers for disciplinary action. Id.
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based written modification of the protective order., 124 Similarly,
counsel may introduce information from the records at trial only
if counsel first files a motion in limine "at or before any final
,,125 te. 126pretrial conference, and the judge, after a hearing,
concludes that introduction of specific documents or information
contained in the records "is necessary for the moving defendant
to obtain a fair trial.,
127
Massachusetts's highest court has done a superb job in
drafting these procedures. If defense counsel is to be given
access to the witness's privileged counseling records, it is difficult
to imagine how to design a regime better calculated to protect
those records from unnecessary or excessive disclosure.
Nevertheless, Massachusetts's decision to allow defense counsel
to review the records without prior judicial screening is poor
public policy for at least three reasons. First, it may not
adequately protect the records from unauthorized disclosure
because enforcement of the protective orders may not be as
absolute as the court supposes. It is not unheard of for an
unscrupulous attorney to leak protected information where he
believes that doing so will help the client and the leak will not be
traceable back to him. z8
Second, it may not adequately protect the records from
unauthorized disclosure because human mistakes are inevitable.
A clerk may mislabel the documents. An attorney's handwritten
notes may be seen by outsiders. An e-mail containing discussion
124 Id. "The motion shall be accompanied by an affidavit explaining with
specificity the reason why copying or disclosure is necessary; the motion and the
affidavit shall not disclose the content of any presumptively privileged record.
Counsel shall provide notice of the motion to all parties." Id. app. at 422.
125 Id.
126 Prior to ruling on defendant's motion in limine, the prosecutor "shall be
permitted to review enough of the presumptively privileged records to be able
adequately to respond to the motion in limine, subject to signing and filing a
protective order" similar to the one that defense counsel must sign. Id. app. at 422-
23.
127 Id. app. at 423. "Before permitting the introduction in evidence of such
records, the judge shall consider alternatives to introduction, including an agreed to
stipulation or introduction of redacted portions of the records." Id.
128 In a typical case, at least some of the information contained in the records is
also likely to be known to the witness's close friends or relatives, to those who
provided the counseling, and to members of the counselor's staff. The existence of
other potential sources for the leak will often make it difficult to positively identify
the culprit.
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of such matters, intended for a limited distribution, may be sent
accidentally to a much-wider readership.
Third, and most important, even if the Dwyer procedures do
prevent unauthorized and unnecessary disclosure, the court
failed to consider-indeed, expressed not a syllable of concern
about-the impact they are likely to have on the witness.
Consider the circumstance of a woman who has been raped. The
crime itself likely has had a traumatic, shattering, and destructive
impact on her ability to live the life she had before it was
committed. In an effort to deal with and recover from her
ordeal, she has undergone counseling, during which she may
have disclosed information, thoughts, fears, and self-doubts of
the most intensely personal and private kind. It is bad enough
that, come the trial, she must relive her ordeal before an
audience of strangers, and that the judge will examine her
records to determine whether they contain information that
must be disclosed to the defense. In Massachusetts, however,
she must take the witness stand knowing that her rapist's lawyer,
whose primary responsibility is to attack her testimony,
credibility and character, has read the entire file of her
counseling. The lawyers in the case may have every confidence
that defense counsel has adhered and will adhere to the rules.
To the witness, by contrast, this may provide little comfort
compared to the sense of betrayal, humiliation, and exposure she
is likely to experience.
2. Timing of In Camera Review
Most courts that have discussed the issue have held that a
defendant has no right to seek in camera review of a witness's
therapy or counseling records prior to trial; rather, the
procedure may be invoked only after the witness has testified on
direct.
129
129 See infra Part V.D. (discussing when, if ever, defense counsel can seek in
camera review of the privileged records by the court).
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3. Determining Whether a Privilege Protects the Records130
To assess whether a privilege protects the witness's records, a
trial court should apply the following procedure:
(1) A defendant seeking a complainant's or other witness's
counseling records pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 17 or a state equivalent must file a motion with the
court specifying the entity that holds the records and the name
of the witness, "and describing, as precisely as possible, the
records sought.' 13' The motion must be accompanied by an
affidavit setting forth the defendant's factual basis to believe that
the records contain information to which the defendant must
have access in order to receive a fair trial.
(2) The defendant must serve the motion and affidavit on the
prosecutor and any codefendants. The prosecutor in turn must
forward copies to the record holder and, if possible, the
witness, 132 and notify them of the time and date that a hearing
133
will be held on the motion for the subpoena.
130 As will be apparent in the following footnotes, the rest of this subsection relies
heavily on a detailed set of procedures developed over the course of many opinions
by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, the most recent of which,
Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 859 N.E.2d 400 (Mass. 2006), abrogated many aspects of
what state courts referred to as the "Bishop-Fuller" protocol. See Commonwealth
v. Fuller, 667 N.E.2d 847, 855 (Mass. 1996); Commonwealth v. Bishop, 617 N.E.2d
990, 997-98 (Mass. 1993); see also Commonwealth v. Oliveira, 780 N.E.2d 453, 459-
65 (Mass. 2002); see generally Ellen M. Crowley, Note, In Camera Inspections of
Privileged Records in Sexual Assault Trials: Balancing Defendants' Rights and State
Interests Under Massachusetts's Bishop Test, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 131 (1995).
131 Dwyer, 859 N.E.2d 400 app. at 420.
132 Cases may arise in which the individual whose records are sought is not a
witness, for example where that person is dead or incompetent to testify. The
procedures outlined herein should be adaptable to cover that situation as well.
133 See Dwyer, 859 N.E.2d 400 app. at 420. In Massachusetts, the prosecutor must
also inform the record holder and witness that:
(i) [T]he ... hearing shall proceed even if either is absent; (ii) the hearing
shall be the [witness's] only opportunity to address the court; (iii) any
statutory privilege applicable to the records sought shall remain in effect
unless and until the [witness] affirmatively waives any such privilege, and
that failure to attend the hearing shall not constitute a waiver of any such
privilege; and (iv) if the [witness] is the [alleged] victim in the case, he or
she has the opportunity to confer with the prosecutor prior to the hearing.
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(3) The subpoena must direct that the records be submitted to
the court, not to the defendant who obtained the subpoena.
(4) Prior to the hearing, neither the parties nor the court may
inspect the records. 
35
(5) At the hearing on the defendant's motion, all parties, the
record holder, and the witness may be heard as to whether the
record is privileged136 and, if so, whether the defendant has made
a showing sufficient to require an in camera inspection of the
records by the trial court.
(6) The judge issues findings of fact and law, setting forth
whether the records are or are not privileged.
137
134 Federal case law suggests that when a defendant subpoenas evidence using
FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c), the evidence must be delivered to the court directly, and not
defense counsel. See United States v. Santiago-Lugo, 904 F. Supp. 43, 46 (D.P.R.
1995) (stating "[n]owhere in Fed.R.Crim.P. 17 do we find language allowing the
utilization of the court's subpoena power privately, with a secret return directly to
an attorney"); United States v. Najarian, 164 F.R.D. 484, 487 (D. Minn. 1995) ("As
we read the plain language of Rule 17(c), the documents being subpoenaed are 'to
be produced before the court."'); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c)(1) (stating that
"[w]hen the items arrive, the court may permit the parties and their attorneys to
inspect all or part of them").
This discussion from Najarian was approved more recently by the Federal
District Court for the District of Minnesota. See United States v. Agboola, No. 00-
100-JRT/FLN, 2001 WL 1640094, at *6 (D. Minn. Oct. 31, 2001) ("[Tlhe Court
would find no reason to grant Agboola's request to deliver the documents directly
to his counsel. The plain language of Rule 17(c) requires subpoenaed documents
'to be produced before the court."' (citing Najarian, 164 F.R.D. at 487)).
Moreover, the court in Santiago-Luga also suggests that when a subpoena is used
under Rule 17(c), notice must be made to all parties, parallel to the mandate of
FED. R. Civ. P. 45(b)(1). See Santiago-Luga, 904 F. Supp. at 47 (finding that civil
subpoenas issued for the criminal action were improper for, among other things,
failure to provide notice to all parties).
State courts also have addressed the issue. See State v. Gonzales, 2005 UT 72, 125
P.3d 878, discussed infra note 139.
135 Because most states require the defendant to make a sufficient showing of
need even to trigger an in camera review of the records by the trial judge, it follows
that no one should examine the records unless and until that showing is made.
Massachusetts requires that defense counsel be allowed to examine the records in
camera, but only after an adequate showing of need. There, too, it follows that the
records are off-limits to all participants unless that showing is made.
136 Dwyer, 859 N.E.2d 400 app. at 420.
137 In Massachusetts the judge must state whether any given record is not
privileged, or "presumptively privileged." Id. app. at 420. In that state, defense
counsel, upon signing a protective order, is entitled to inspect presumptively
privileged records. See supra Part V.A.1.
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(7) If the records are not privileged, the defendant is entitled
to review them without any judicial review or screening for
relevance or a special showing of need.
138
(8) If defense counsel improperly obtains and examines
records that are thereafter held to be privileged, the trial court
should take measures to ensure that counsel does not use the
improper information in any way in preparing or presenting the
defense.139
4. Basis for Disclosure if the Record Is Privileged
If the trial court concludes that the communications and
records are privileged, a defendant is entitled to in camera
review of the records 4 ° and, thereafter, to disclosure of pertinent
138 See Dwyer, 859 N.E.2d 400 app. at 420; State v. Davis, 186 S.W.3d 367, 372
(Mo. Ct. App. 2005). The trial court may nevertheless restrict public access or
disclosure if the records contain confidential or personal information. Dwyer, 859
N.E.2d 400 app. at 421 n.5. Such information should not be accessible to the public
nor disclosed by defense counsel if it would be inadmissible on evidentiary grounds
at trial. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 402 (admitting only relevant evidence); FED. R.
EVID. 403 (authorizing a judge to exclude evidence whose relevance is substantially
outweighed by various negative considerations, including the risk of unfair
prejudice, confusion, waste of time, and the like); FED. R. EVID. 611(a) (directing
the trial court to "exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of
interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to ... protect witnesses from
harassment or undue embarrassment").
139 In State v. Gonzales, 2005 UT 72, 125 P.3d 878, counsel filled out a subpoena
directing the child sexual-abuse complainant's records be delivered to him, not, as
state rules required, to the court, and also violated state rules by failing to inform
the prosecutor of the subpoena (thereby precluding the state from moving to
quash). Id. 12. Counsel inspected the records before reporting the matter to the
court. Id. 15. The trial judge pointed out that counsel had created "a possibly
insurmountable conflict of interest," because it was impossible to separate counsel's
knowledge of the privileged information from his knowledge of the rest of the case.
Id. 18. Counsel took the hint and moved to withdraw; the court granted the
motion and appointed new counsel. Id. J1 10-18. On appeal, the state supreme
court reached four significant conclusions. First, the court held that such records
must be deliverable to the court, not to counsel. Id. T 44-45. Second, the fact that
counsel sought to impeach the complainant's credibility did not render her mental
condition "an element of any claim or defense," and therefore the case did not fall
within an exception to the privilege for such records. Id. TT 42-43. Third, the court
agreed that the trial judge properly granted a motion to quash the subpoena based
on counsel's improper conduct. Id. 9 41, 45. Fourth, because counsel voluntarily
withdrew, this rendered moot the defendant's assertion that the court denied him
the right to counsel of his choice. Id. 91 46.
140 In most jurisdictions, this in camera review is performed by the trial judge, but
Massachusetts permits it to be conducted by defense counsel under specified
circumstances and conditions. See supra Part V.A.1.
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portions of them, only if the defendant makes an adequate
showing of necessity.
1 41
5. Appellate Review
A defendant may seek appellate review of a trial judge's
decision to disclose or withhold a witness's records only if the
defendant's showing satisfied the standard referred to in the
previous paragraph. If that showing was sufficient and the
defendant seeks review of the trial judge's nondisclosure, the
appellate court should "review the judge's in camera decision
making as to relevance within the scope of the proffer, using a
deferential abuse of discretion standard.',
42
B. Showing Required for In Camera Review and Disclosure
1. Overview
What kind of preliminary showing must a defendant make to
trigger an in camera review of a state witness's mental-health or
counseling records?
On one point there appears to be a unanimous consensus. In
sexual-assault and child abuse cases, there is general agreement
that a defendant must do more than speculate that, because the
complainant has participated in counseling or therapy after the
alleged assault, the records in question might contain statements
about the incident or incidents that are inconsistent with the
complainant's testimony at trial.
141 See infra Part V.B (discussion of various standards employed by state and
federal courts). This Article, in turn, recommends that disclosure of privileged
information by the trial judge is appropriate only when the information raises
significant doubts about the truthfulness or accuracy of the witness's testimony. See
infra Part V.C.1.
142 Commonwealth v. Feliciano, 816 N.E.2d 1205, 1209 (Mass. 2004).
143 People v. Foggy, 521 N.E.2d 86, 91-92 (Ill. 1988) (defendant charged with
abducting and raping a twenty-six-year-old woman); Commonwealth v. Barroso,
122 S.W.3d 554, 564 (Ky. 2003) (rape of an adult woman); Goldsmith v. State, 651
A.2d 866, 876-77 (Md. 1995) (defendant charged with raping and otherwise sexually
abusing his stepdaughter from ages seven to fourteen; she was twenty-five years old
at trial.); People v. Stanaway, 521 N.W.2d 557, 576 (Mich. 1994) (intercourse with a
fourteen-year-old girl); State v. Hoag, 749 A.2d 331, 332-33 (N.H. 2000) (sexual
assault of a nine-year-old girl); State v. Gonzales, 1998-NMCA-026, 21, 912 P.2d
297 (rape of an adult woman); People v. Bush, 788 N.Y.S.2d 258, 259 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2005) (rape of fourteen-year-old girl); State v. Blake, 2002 UT 113, 1$ 19-24,
63 P.3d 56 (sexual misconduct with a twelve-year-old girl); Farish v.
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Because this assertion can be plausibly made in every sexual-
assault or child molestation case, if this was enough to trigger an
in camera review, a court would be required to conduct the
review in virtually every such case. 14 4  Moreover, at least two
courts have supported such decisions based on their belief that:
[T]he role of rape crisis counselors is not to investigate the
occurrence. Rather, the primary purpose of the counseling is
to help the victim understand and resolve her feelings about
the event. Thus . . . an in camera inspection of counseling
records would not likely result in the disclosure of any material
useful to an accused.
145
Similarly, in prosecutions of other types of crimes, it does not
suffice to allege that at some point in a witness's life, he received
treatment or counseling for an emotional or mental difficulty or
drug or substance abuse. To obtain an in camera review of the
witness's records, the defendant must make a more factually
specific showing that the records will reveal some significant
condition relevant to the witness's credibility or the accuracy of
his testimony.146
Commonwealth, 346 S.E.2d 736, 737-38 (Va. Ct. App. 1986) (rape of an adult
woman); State v. Kalakosky, 852 P.2d 1064, 1076-77 (Wash. 1993) (rape; it is
unclear which of the five victims' records were sought-the victims ranged in age
from thirteen to twenty-six); State v. Green, 2002 WI App. 68, J1 33, 37, 253 Wis.
2d 356, 1$ 33, 37, 646 N.W.2d 298, 33, 37 (rape of a twelve-year-old girl;
defendant's argument that girl's counseling records might contain statements
inconsistent with what she told the police was "not even a close call").
144 See, e.g., Stanaway, 521 N.W.2d at 576; Kalakosky, 852 P.2d at 1076-77.
145 Foggy, 521 N.E.2d at 91 (basing this conclusion on amicus briefs filed in the
case); see also State v. Pinder, 678 So. 2d 410, 416-17 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)
(basing this conclusion on the testimony of counselors at a hearing in the trial
court). On the other hand, query whether it is possible for the victim to
"understand and resolve her feelings about the event" without some discussion of
the event itself.
146 See, e.g., State v. Joyner, 625 A.2d 791, 806 (Conn. 1993); see also State v.
D'Ambrosio, 561 A.2d 422, 427 (Conn. 1989), abrogated by State v. Bruno, 673
A.2d 1117 (Conn. 1996). "We have never held that a history of alcohol or drug
abuse or treatment automatically makes a witness fair game for disclosure of
psychiatric records to a criminal defendant." Joyner, 625 A.2d at 806 (citations
omitted).
Similarly, a Missouri court held, "[An allegation that] the records in dispute might
have had a bearing on [a state witness's] competency to testify," absent some
evidence that the "witness exhibits some mental infirmity and fails to meet the
traditional criteria for witness competence," is not enough to overcome the
"presumption that a witness is competent to testify." State v. Taylor, 134 S.W.3d 21,
26-27 (Mo. 2004) (en banc) (witness in a murder trial).
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There is, as one court has recognized, a kind of "Catch-22" to
this: a defendant is required to demonstrate that the
information sought is material and favorable enough to require
disclosure, even though he does not have access to the
147information. Yet there is general agreement that before a
defendant can trigger an in camera review of the records, let
alone win discovery of their contents, the defendant must do
more than merely suggest they contain relevant information.
As to how much more than probable relevance a defendant
must show, no clear consensus has emerged. Rather, courts have
used a variety of terms to articulate the appropriate standard.
These formulations vary in what the defendant must seek to
show, and how persuasively the defendant must show it, in order
to trigger the in camera review by the court.
1 48
147 State v. Bassine, 71 P.3d 72, 76 n.9 (Or. Ct. App. 2003). The court stated:
We recognize the Catch 22 quality to that test, which results from the
conflict between a defendant's constitutional right to produce witnesses in
his favor and venerated evidentiary privileges. The test acknowledges that
the information sought is confidential, but nonetheless requires the party
seeking the information to demonstrate that the information, which the
party does not have access to, is material and favorable.
Id.
Catch-22 is the title of Joseph Heller's darkly comic novel about American
servicemen in World War II. JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22 (Simon & Schuster
Paperbacks 2004) (1955). One pilot persistently sought to be grounded on the
grounds that he was insane:
There was only one catch and that was Catch-22, which specified that a
concern for one's own safety in the face of dangers that were real and
immediate was the process of a rational mind. Orr was crazy and could be
grounded. All he had to do was ask; and as soon as he did, he would no
longer be crazy and would have to fly more missions. Orr would be crazy
to fly more missions and sane if he didn't, but if he was sane he had to fly
them. If he flew them he was crazy and didn't have to; but if he didn't want
to he was sane and had to.
Id. at 46.
148 The following is a representative sample:
A defendant must "make a preliminary showing that there is a reasonable ground
to believe that the failure to produce the records would likely impair his right to
impeach the witness." State v. Peeler, 857 A.2d 808, 841 (Conn. 2004) (quoting
State v. Slimskey, 779 A.2d 723, 732 (Conn. 2001)).
"To obtain in camera review of confidential communications or records under [an
'absolute' privilege], a defendant must first establish a reasonable probability that
the privileged matters contain material information necessary to his defense."
Pinder, 678 So. 2d at 417 (citation omitted).
A defendant must demonstrate that: "1) [T]here is a legitimate need to disclose
the protected information; 2) the information is relevant and material to the issue
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How is one to rank, in difficulty of proof, "a reasonable
ground to believe,"' 14 9  "a reasonable probability, a150 "
reasonable belief,"'' 51 "a reasonable likelihood,, 152 "a good-faith
belief, grounded on some demonstrable fact, 1 53 and "reasonable
certainty"?1 54 How is one to compare "'would likely impair his
right to impeach the witness,'' ' 55  "material information
necessary to [the] defense,' 56 "information ... relevant and
before the court; and, 3) the party seeking to pierce the privilege shows by a
'preponderance of the evidence' that 'no less intrusive source' for that information
exists." State v. L.J.P., 637 A.2d 532, 537 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (quoting
United Jersey Bank v. Wolosoff, 483 A.2d 821, 826 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1984))
(quoted approvingly in State v. Peseti, 65 P.3d 119, 129 (Haw. 2003)).
"[fn camera review of a witness's psychotherapy records is authorized only upon
receipt of evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable belief that the records
contain exculpatory evidence." Commonwealth v. Barroso, 122 S.W.3d 554, 564
(Ky. 2003). "If the in camera inspection reveals exculpatory evidence, i.e., evidence
favorable to the accused and material to guilt or punishment, including
impeachment evidence, that evidence must be disclosed to the defendant if
unavailable from less intrusive sources." Id. (citing Eldred v. Commonwealth, 906
S.W.2d 694, 701 (Ky. 1994)).
"[A] defendant must establish a reasonable likelihood that the privileged records
contain exculpatory information necessary for a proper defense." Goldsmith v.
State, 651 A.2d 866, 877 (Md. 1995).
Defendant must make a "showing [of] a good-faith belief, grounded on some
demonstrable fact, that there is a reasonable probability that the records are likely
to contain material information necessary to the defense." People v. Stanaway, 521
N.W.2d 557, 574 (Mich. 1994). Disclosure to defense counsel is permissible only if
the trial judge has inspected the records and "is satisfied that the records reveal
evidence necessary to the defense." Id. at 575.
A defendant must show "'with reasonable certainty that exculpatory evidence
exists which would be favorable to [the] defense."' State v. Blake, 2002 UT 113, $1
19, 63 P.3d 56 (quoting State v. Cardall, 1999 UT 51, 1 30, 982 P.2d 79) (alteration in
original).
To obtain in camera review of the records, "a defendant must show a reasonable
likelihood that the records will be necessary to a determination of guilt or
innocence." State v. Green, 2002 WI App. 68, 32, 253 Wis. 2d 356, $1 32, 646
N.W.2d 298, 32 (internal quotation marks omitted).
149 Peeler, 857 A.2d at 841 (Connecticut).
150 Pinder, 678 So. 2d at 417 (Florida).
151 Barroso, 122 S.W.3d at 563 (Kentucky).
152 Goldsmith, 651 A.2d at 877 (Maryland); Green, 2002 WI App. 68, $ 19
(Wisconsin).
153 Stanaway, 521 N.W.2d at 574 (Michigan).
154 State v. Blake, 2002 UT 113, 19, 63 P.3d 56 (quoting State v. Cardall, 1999
UT 51, 91 30, 983 P.2d 79).
155 State v. Peeler, 857 A.2d 808, 841 (Conn. 2004) (quoting State v. Slimskey, 779
A.2d 723, 732 (Conn. 2001)).
156 State v. Pinder, 678 So. 2d 410, 417 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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material to the issue before the court,"'157 "evidence favorable to
the accused and material to guilt or punishment, including
impeachment evidence,' 58 "exculpatory information necessary
for a proper defense,' 59 "exculpatory evidence which is relevant
and material to the issue of the defendant's guilt," i.e., "material
information necessary to the defense,"'1 60 "'exculpatory evidence
.. which would be favorable to [the] defense"' 161 (is there any
other kind of "exculpatory evidence"?), and "necessary to a
determination of guilt or innocence"?16 2  And how is one to
assess the sum, or quotient, of one from column A and one from
column B?
The extent to which these differences in language denote
significant differences of substance can only be answered (if it
can be answered at all!) by examining in detail how various
courts have applied their standards to specific cases. That is the
subject of the next several sections.
2. Rape and Child Abuse Cases
Where a defendant is charged with rape or with sexual abuse
of a child, courts have given serious consideration to discovery
requests in three relatively specific situations, as well as a variety
of other circumstances.
a. Recantation or Other Contradictory Conduct
Several courts have held that, where the defense makes a
specific showing that the complainant may have recanted the
allegation against the defendant, an in camera review of relevant
records to ascertain whether the complainant likewise recanted
her allegation during therapy or counseling is justified. 163 The
157 State v. L.J.P., 637 A.2d 532, 537 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (New
Jersey) (quoted approvingly in State v. Peseti, 65 P.3d 119, 129 (Haw. 2003)).
158 Commonwealth v. Barroso, 122 S.W.3d 554, 564 (Ky. 2003).
159 Goldsmith v. State, 651 A.2d 866, 877 (Md. 1995).
160 People v. Stanaway, 521 N.W.2d 557, 574 (Mich. 1994).
161 State v. Blake, 2002 UT 113, 19, 63 P.3d 56 (quoting State v. Cardall, 1999
UT 51, 30, 982 P.2d 79).
162 State v. Green, 2002 WI App. 68, 19, 253 Wis. 2d 356, 19, 646 N.W.2d 298,
9119.
163 See, e.g., State v. Peseti, 65 P.3d 119, 132-33 (Haw. 2003). Peseti was charged
with third-degree sexual assault for fondling his foster daughter. Id. at 122. The
court held that, despite statutory privileges, the trial court violated defendant's
20071
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same is true where the defendant proffers evidence that the
complainant had not made such allegations during counseling or
therapy, where her failure to do so implicitly contradicts the
charges she has subsequently brought against the defendant.
' 64
rights under the state constitution's confrontation clause in precluding defendant
from asking the complainant on cross-examination whether she told her counselor
that in fact the defendant had not touched her inappropriately. See id. at 129-30.
Counsel had learned of the alleged recantation from a social worker. Id. at 123.
Although a foster sister testified to similar recantations by the complainant, the
sister's animosity toward the complainant may have undermined the sister's
credibility with the jury; hence, excluding references to the exculpatory statement to
the counselor was not harmless error. Id. at 129-30.
In another case, the nine-year-old complainant told the police that the defendant
penetrated her (which defendant denied), and caused her pain, but told a physician
who examined her that there had been no penetration and no pain. State v. Hoag,
749 A.2d 331, 332 (N.H. 2000). The court held that this sufficed to require an in
camera inspection of her counseling records. Id. at 333.
164 See Missouri ex rel. White v. Gray, 141 S.W.3d 460, 466-67 (Mo. Ct. App.
2004). In 1991, White married McKenna, the mother of two young children. Id. at
462. In 1995, White petitioned to adopt the children; McKenna supported the
petition. Id. A state agency performed a home study and psychological testing, and
filed a report with recommendations. Id. In January, 1996, the petition was
approved. Id. In March of 1998, J.L., one of the children, told McKenna that since
the summer of 1995 (a time that preceded the adoption), White had been touching
her inappropriately. Id. The court held that White was entitled to disclosure of
information in the state agency's adoption file. Id. at 467. The opinion does not
specify the file's contents, but it is reasonable to conclude that it contained neither
allegations by J.L. against White, nor anything else to suggest he had behaved
improperly toward either of the children. It is inconceivable that the state agency
would have approved the adoption otherwise. Incidentally, White had previously
been convicted in the case, but the conviction was reversed because the prosecutor
withheld information that the lead detective on the case was having an affair with
McKenna during the investigation and trial-a fact that, the court noted laconically,
"would have served to impeach the police work and [McKenna's] testimony." Id. at
462. By the time the litigation concerning the file reached the appellate court,
McKenna had married the detective. See id. at 462 n.2. (McKenna now shares the
name of the lead detective, McKinley.) All those who consider McKenna a good
role model for her daughter are invited to meet in my upper-left-hand desk drawer.
There should be plenty of room.
In another case, State v. L.J.P., 637 A.2d 532 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994),
prior to trial, the judge disclosed the complainant's Division for Youth and Family
Services file to both the prosecutor and defense counsel; the file indicated that the
complainant told a psychologist that her accusations of sexual abuse by her
stepfather were untrue. Id. at 537-38. At trial, however, the judge refused to
permit counsel to elicit this information from the psychologist. Id. at 535. Held:
the judge's denial was reversible error. Id. at 538. Although the complainant had
also recanted to other witnesses (family members), those recantations could be
discounted as having been coerced; the same could not be said with regard to the
recantation to the psychologist. Id.
In State v. Speese, 528 N.W.2d 63 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995), rev'd, 545 N.W.2d 510
(Wis. 1996), defendant allegedly assaulted the teenage complainant in January and
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And more generally, evidence that a complainant acted in a way
that is highly inconsistent with her allegations of sexual assault
or extortion should suffice to require in camera inspection of
records, at least where the complainant was in counseling or
therapy at the same time as the alleged crimes and inconsistent
conduct. 165
February of 1991; complainant was hospitalized in February of 1991. Id. at 67. Had
she told hospital personnel about the alleged assault, they would have been obliged
by law to report it to the police; yet no criminal investigation was initiated until the
complainant's mother reported the alleged assault in September of that year. Id. at
70. From this, defendant argued, it was reasonable to infer that the complainant did
not tell hospital personnel about the alleged assault, which in turn might persuade a
jury to disbelieve her testimony that the assault occurred. Id. Instead, the trial
court conducted an in camera inspection and concluded that the records contained
nothing material. Id. at 71. An intermediate appellate court held that defendant
had made an adequate preliminary showing, and that the trial court should have
ruled that unless the complainant consented to an in camera inspection, she would
not be permitted to testify. Id. The appellate court also inspected the records,
concluded that they did contain information material to the defense, reversed the
conviction, and remanded for a new trial with instructions that unless the
complainant voluntarily consented to disclosure, she would not be permitted to
testify at the retrial. Id. On appeal, the state supreme court reversed and reinstated
the conviction, concluding that the error in not disclosing the information was
harmless because the jury was well aware of the complainant's inconsistent
behavior and failure to inform hospital officials about the assault. State v. Speese,
545 N.W.2d 510, 513 (Wis. 1996).
In People v. Higgins, 784 N.Y.S.2d 232 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004), at defendant's trial
for sexually abusing his daughter from the time she was nine until she was fifteen
(when she reported him to the police), defendant was permitted to elicit from her
social workers that she was treated by them. Id. at 234. The court instructed the
jury that the counselors would have been legally obligated to report any allegations
of sexual abuse, and they made no such reports, from which, naturally, the
defendant argued that she made no such allegations to them. Id. Held: this
testimony gave defendant all he was entitled to; the trial judge's decision to deny
discovery of her counseling records was therefore no abuse of discretion. Id.
165 See State v. Luna, 1996-NMCA-071, 122 N.M. 143, 921 P.2d 950.
Complainant, a married woman, began an affair with a coworker, which lasted four
years, then alleged that during most of that period the defendant extorted sexual
favors from her by threatening to reveal nude pictures of her to her husband if she
broke off the relationship. Id. at 951. During the period of supposed extortion, she
entered counseling, and also wrote what she herself described as a "very emotional
melodramatic letter telling [Defendant] of my love for him." Id. at 952 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). The court held that this sufficed
to justify an in camera inspection of her counseling records to determine whether
they contained information material to the defense. See id. at 953 (lower court did
not abuse its discretion in granting access to counseling records when privilege was
not asserted until after disclosure of records).
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b. Evidence of Behavioral, Mental, or Emotional Difficulties
Courts have also mandated in camera review of a
complainant's counseling or therapy records where the defense
offers evidence that the complainant has engaged in other
behavior, particularly relating to sexual conduct, which, although
not directly related to her allegations against the defendant,
nonetheless casts doubts on the credibility of those allegations.
One such situation arises where the defendant can show that the
complainant has previously made a false rape accusation and
underwent counseling at that time or at the time she filed
charges against the defendant.' 66
The same is true where the defendant makes a plausible
showing of other sexually related behavior 167 that has special and
unusual relevance to the case at hand.168 In such circumstances,
it is reasonable to believe that records of the complainant's
counseling during the period in question may contain
information relevant to the credibility of the charges against the
defendant.
169
166 See Commonwealth v. Feliciano, 816 N.E.2d 1205, 1209-10 (Mass. 2004). Two
men were accused of raping a seventeen-year-old girl; they claimed she consented.
Id. at 1207. The victim was being treated in the aftermath of surgery to remove a
brain tumor. Id. The victim's father had testified in the grand jury that the girl
sometimes made up stories to get something she wanted, and a previous rape case
involving the girl had been nolle prossed. Id. The court held that the trial judge
properly concluded that this was an adequate showing to trigger an in camera
review, id. at 1210, for "disclosure of information in the victim's counseling records
concerning her tendency to imagine or to fabricate, and any reference to the prior
rape case," id. at 1207. See also 3 FISHMAN & MCKENNA supra note 41, §§ 19:42-
47 (concerning the general question of whether evidence that a rape complainant
has made prior rape accusations).
167 As a rule, evidence of a sexual-offense complainant's prior sexual behavior is
inadmissible. See generally FED. R. EVID. 412. The subject is exhaustively covered
in 3 FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 41, § 19.
168 See generally 3 FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 41, §§ 19:51-55.
169 See, e.g., People v. Stanaway, 521 N.W.2d 557 (Mich. 1994). In Stanaway, the
court considered the issue in two unrelated cases involving defendants Stanaway
and Caruso. Id. Caruso was charged with fondling his eight-year-old niece. Id. at
564. Caruso alleged that the complainant was a "troubled, maladjusted child"; he
asserted a "good-faith belief" that she had been sexually abused by her biological
father, that the lack of any resolution to this incident may have prompted her to
falsely accuse defendant and that she had written a letter to her mother's boyfriend
offering to have sex with him in his car. Id. at 576-77. The court held that these
allegations "may have demonstrated a realistic and substantial possibility that the
material he requested might contain information necessary to his defense," and
remanded for further action by the trial court. Id. (Noting that the statutory
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c. Complainant's Ability to Perceive, Remember, and Relate
Events
Courts have likewise considered whether such review is
required where specific evidence suggested that the
complainant's ability to perceive, remember, or relate events was
uncertain. At least one case has arisen involving each of the
170following: mental retardation, the effects of prescribed
171 172
medication, 1 ' drug and alcohol abuse, documented problems
with memory, 73 and other characteristics.
74
privileges in question were absolute in their terms, the court held that if the judge
determined that the defendant was entitled to the records but the complainant
refused to waive the privilege, the complainant's testimony would be suppressed);
see also supra Part IV.A.
170 Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 661 N.E.2d 65, 67-69 (Mass. 1996) (holding, in
essence, that where the defense has offered evidence suggesting that complainant
was mildly retarded and sometimes had difficulty distinguishing reality from
fantasy, an in camera inspection of the complainant's mental-health records is
justified).
171 State v. Pandolfi, 765 A.2d 1037, 1043 (N.H. 2000). When, on cross-
examination, the complainant in a sexual-assault case testified that she may have
been confused about the dates because of the medication she was taking in
connection with her counseling, this sufficed to require an in camera review of the
counseling records to determine what medication, if any, the witness was taking,
and to disclose that information to defense counsel. Id. at 1042-43. The court
determined that the trial judge erred in refusing to disclose this portion of the
records, but the trial judge was correct in refusing to disclose other aspects of the
records to the defense. Id. at 1043.
172 See, e.g., State v. Gonzales, 1996-NMCA-026, 121 N.M. 421, 912 P.2d 297.
Complainant admitted drinking four beers and two schnapps in the five hours
immediately preceding her encounter with defendant, and defendant claimed
(though the complainant denied) that they had consumed cocaine together before
intercourse (which he claimed was consensual). Id. 1 2-3. Other evidence showed
that the complainant had a history of blackouts from alcohol. Id. 21. Held: it was
no abuse of discretion to conclude that this justified requiring an in camera
inspection of the complainant's counseling records. Id. $[ 15-16.
173 State v. Pinder, 678 So. 2d 410, 417 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Defendant was
charged with abducting the complainant, raping her, and shooting her in the head.
Id. at 411. The complainant testified that although she had problems with her
memory generally as a result of her injuries, she remembered the incident in detail.
Id. The trial judge ordered an in camera review of the relevant records and
subpoenaed the counselor to assist in that review; the State appealed. Id. at 412.
The appellate court held that defendant had failed to meet the "reasonable
probability" test. Id. at 413. The court stressed that the sexual-assault counselor
had testified that her primary function was to explain how a victim and her family
get through the medical examinations, legal systems, and other repercussions of the
assault, rather than to discuss the assault itself with her in any detail. Id. at 411-12.
"Given the function of counseling," the court reasoned, "it is improbable that an in
camera inspection of counseling records would uncover information critical to the
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d. Other Situations Involving Rape and Child Abuse Complaints
Numerous other examples of judicial assessment of specific
factual allegations in other circumstances exist.
175
3. Criminal Cases Generally
The question of defense access to mental therapy or
counseling records arises less often, but still with some
defense, irreplaceable by other means." Id. at 415-16. The court noted that Florida
procedure "provides for extensive discovery, and allows a defendant to take
depositions of persons with information relevant to the offense charged, including
the victim. A defendant has access to unprivileged statements made by the victim
to the police, her family or other witnesses." Id. at 416. Thus, the defendant had
ample other opportunities to obtain such information from unprivileged sources.
Id.
In Wagner v. Commonwealth, 581 S.W.2d 352 (Ky. 1979), overruled on other
grounds by Estep v. Commonwealth, 663 S.W.2d 213 (Ky. 1983), which preceded
Ritchie by several years, the court held that the defendant was properly denied
discovery of the psychiatric records of a charitable, private hospital, because the
state did not have custody or control over the records. Id. at 355. The court held,
however, that it was reversible error to preclude defendant from cross-examining
the complainant about her psychiatric history where the proffered evidence would
have established that she had been committed to a psychiatric hospital prior to the
events at issue for attempted suicide, severe depression, and drug abuse, and that at
the time of the alleged events, she was under psychiatric care and was receiving
shock treatments that were affecting her memory. Id. at 355.
174 Commonwealth v. Feliciano, 816 N.E.2d 1205, 1207-09 (Mass. 2004); see also
supra note 164.
For further information, see United States v. Diamond, 964 F.2d 1325, 1329 (2d
Cir. 1992), and State v. Jackson, 862 A.2d 880, 889 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005) ("[T]he
trial court must determine whether the records are especially probative of the
witnesses's capacity to relate the truth or to observe, recollect and narrate relevant
occurrences...." (quoting State v. Peeler, 857 A.2d 808, 841 (Conn. 2004))).
175 For example, in State v. Behnke, 553 N.W.2d 265 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996),
defendant was accused of raping complainant, hitting her on the face, eye, and
chest, and biting her genital area; a physician testified that the day after the alleged
attack, she had bruises and bite marks on those parts of her body. Id. at 268.
Defendant alleged that the complainant had previously told the defendant that she
had a history of self-abuse that included inflicting cuts and bruises on her arms, and
sought access to the complainant's medical records, alleging that the records might
show that the bruises in question were self-inflicted. Id. at 269. The court held that
it was not error to refuse an in camera review of the records of complainant's
medical treatment following the rape. Id. First, the wounds confirmed by the
doctor were radically different in kind than the self-inflicted kind about which she
had told the defendant. Id. Second, they were of a kind that were unlikely to have
been self-inflicted. Id. Third, despite defendant's allegation that the complainant
had a psychological disorder (based on the statements that she had made to him
regarding her self-abuse), he had offered no evidence she sought and received
mental-health counseling. Id.
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frequency, in cases where the recipient of the therapy or
counseling was only a witness, not a victim or complainant. An
in camera review of appropriate records is required where a
defendant makes an adequate showing to suggest that the
witness suffered from a significant impairment in testimonial
capacity-that is, in the ability to perceive, remember, or
accurately narrate what he has seen, done, and heard.
176
Less clear is whether a more generalized showing of
emotional and mental difficulties or substance abuse suffices to
require an in camera inspection. A Connecticut murder case,
State v. Bruno,7 7 illustrates the issue. One of the State's key
witnesses (who was sixteen at the time of the crime) testified that
he participated in beating the victim unconscious and then
176 See, for instance, State v. Peeler, 857 A.2d 808, 841 (Conn. 2004), which held
that the trial judge erred in precluding the defense's use of records containing
information that "both prior to and after the murders, [the witness] was diagnosed
with significant mental disorders, including 'cocaine induced psychiatric disorder
with hallucinations,' 'chronic paranoid schizophrenia,' 'drug induced psychosis'
while using cocaine, and antisocial personality disorder." Id. at 842. The court
further held that, in light of other overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt, the
error was harmless. Id. at 844-46; see also Commonwealth v. Feliciano, 667 N.E.2d
847, 855 (Mass. 1996); State v. Pandolfi, 765 A.2d 1037 (N.H. 2000); infra Part
V.B.2.b. (discussion of Pandolfi and Feliciano).
In another case, Bobo v. State, 349 S.E.2d 690, 692 (Ga. 1986) (pre-Ritchie
plurality opinion), Bobo was charged with burglary, and with murdering a police
officer and wounding his partner when they went to investigate. Id. at 691. Officer
Sullivan, the surviving officer, was the State's main witness. Id. Defendant
established that Officer Sullivan suffered from posttraumatic stress syndrome as a
result of the event. Id. At a hearing to determine discovery and admissibility of
Officer Sullivan's mental therapy, psychiatrists testified that she had difficulty
concentrating and remembering, but that no evidence showed directly that she was
unable to identify the defendant as the perpetrator or was unsure about her
identification of him. Id. at 693. Moreover, other information was available at trial
to impeach the officer's ability to identify the assailant. Id. at 693-94. A plurality of
the court concluded that "the defendant has failed to show the necessity for the
admission of this privileged information and the trial court properly refused to grant
his request." Id. at 694. In Lucas v. State, 555 S.E.2d 440 (Ga. 2001), the Georgia
Supreme Court noted the Bobo plurality opinion and applied it to the case at hand,
concluding that the trial judge had correctly concluded that records of a
codefendant's psychiatric and psychological counseling contained nothing
exculpatory. Id. at 446.
And see Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 661 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. 1996), in essence
holding that where the defense has offered evidence suggesting that the
complainant, who was mildly retarded, sometimes had difficulty distinguishing
reality from fantasy, an in camera inspection of the complainant's mental-health
records is justified. Id. at 70-71.
177 673 A.2d 1117 (Conn. 1996).
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178
helped the defendant dispose of the body and other evidence.
The defendant (a man in his thirties)179 offered evidence that the
witness had persistent attitude and behavioral problems in
school, had used intravenous drugs and was drinking heavily
around the time of the murder, had received psychiatric
treatment, and was placed in the special-education program.
18 0
The other witness, defendant's eighteen- or nineteen-year-old
girlfriend, testified that she knew in advance of defendant's
intent to kill the victim, and witnessed the crime.'81 Defendant
established that she, too, had a series of mental and emotional
difficulties.182 The court, emphasizing that "what is at issue is the
existence of a mental problem that may bear on the witness' [sic]
testimonial capacity, not the witness' [sic] general character or
intelligence," 18 3 concluded that the defendant failed to establish
a "reasonable ground" to believe that the witnesses' therapy and
counseling records would reveal any significant shortcomings in
their capacity to perceive, remember, and relate what happened,
and therefore upheld the trial judge's refusal to conduct an in
camera examination of the witnesses' records.'84 A dissenting
judge protested that the court had applied too rigid a standard,
178 See id. at 1122.
179 Id. Defendant claimed no memory of the events in question, and
hypothesized that the two witnesses had committed the crime themselves. Id. at
1123.
180 Id. at 1126-27.
181 Id. at 1133.
182 Id. at 1125-26. In her initial statements to the police, the witness lied about
several aspects of the murder. Id. at 1125 n.13. She had been enrolled in a special-
education program in high school because she was unable to learn academic
subjects as rapidly as other students. Id. at 1125. She admitted having trouble
"recalling things," but denied that this difficulty interfered generally with her ability
to recall or relate the events of her life. Id. Approximately four years prior to the
murder, she received three weeks of inpatient psychiatric treatment at a hospital for
depression, followed by a few months of outpatient treatment, and thereafter
consulted from time to time with a psychologist or social worker (the record was
unclear as to which) to deal with problems she had getting along with people. Id. at
1125-26.
183 Id. at 1126.
184 Id. at 1127 (regarding the girlfriend); see also id. at 1126-27 (regarding the
sixteen-year-old accomplice). As to each witness, the court stressed that the school
counselor testified at the hearing that neither witness had demonstrated problems
in perceiving, remembering, or relating information. Id. at 1125-27.
185 Id. at 1140 (Berdon, J., dissenting). Specifically, the dissent noted:
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which improperly required the defendant to establish as fact the
very information for which he was requesting an in camera
review of the records.1
86
Other courts have been less demanding in similar
circumstances. 187 Indeed, in a later case, Connecticut's Supreme
Court held it was error to deny the defendant the right to
introduce information gleaned from such records that indicated
a witness's substantial problems with substance abuse at the time
of the events in question and at the time of the trial. 88
The majority seems to lose sight that this threshold showing is preliminary.
It is not determinative of whether the records are available for use by the
defendant's counsel in his or her cross-examination of a witness. Rather,
the showing merely allows an in camera inspection to determine whether
any admissible impeaching evidence is contained in the records.
Id.
186 Id. The dissent also objected that the trial judge had placed unfair restrictions
on the defendant's ability to elicit the very information he needed to make the
required showing. Id.
187 See, e.g., People v. Dace, 449 N.E.2d 1031 (Il1. App. Ct. 1983), aff'd, 470
N.E.2d 993 (Il. 1984). In Dace, the testimony of an accomplice was the sole
evidence that the defendant had committed a burglary. Id. at 1032-33. A year and
a half before the burglary, the accomplice had been adjudged dangerous to others
and was involuntarily committed to a mental-health hospital. Id. at 1035. The trial
judge precluded the defense from discovering any information about the witness's
mental health or from questioning the witness about it on cross-examination, ruling
that the information was too old to be relevant. Id. at 1033. The appellate court
held that, given the arguable relevance of the information, it was error to preclude
discovery and to prohibit defendant from raising the issue at trial. Id. at 1035. The
state supreme court agreed that, "under the circumstances shown by the evidence,
the refusal to permit the discovery was reversible error." Id. at 996. (Note that the
Dace decisions preceded the Supreme Court's decision in Ritchie v. Pennsylvania,
480 U.S. 39 (1987)).
188 State v. Francis, 836 A.2d 1191 (Conn. 2003). The court observed:
Where, as in the present case,... the trial court does examine the records
and those records indicate a long, persistent and serious history of alcohol
and drug abuse and blackouts, and evidence was presented that the witness
was drinking at the relevant times in question, common sense dictates that
a jury should have that information before it in order properly to gauge the
witness' [sic] general credibility.
Id. at 1201. This was particularly so, the court held, because based on the trial
judge's ruling, the jury could get the impression that the witness had only begun to
drink heavily after his mother's death. Id. Francis was on trial for killing the
witness's mother; the witness provided important testimony suggestive of Francis's
guilt. Id. at 1195. The court held, however, that in light of overwhelming evidence
of Francis's guilt, the error was harmless. Id.
Other courts have decided the issue of what evidence to submit to the jury
similarly. See, e.g., People v. Di Maso, 426 N.E.2d 972, 975 (Il. App. Ct. 1981).
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4. "Unavailable from Less Intrusive Sources"
A number of courts have held that, even if the requisite
standard for in camera review has been established, the
defendant is entitled to disclosure only if comparable evidence is
"unavailable from less intrusive sources."' 89 This is an entirely
appropriate requirement. Courts should recognize, however-
and many do-that it is necessary to assess not only whether a
defendant has other evidence to make the same factual claim,
but also whether the evidence available from less intrusive
sources has persuasive power comparable to that in the
privileged material.' 90
C. Proposed Standards for In Camera Review and Disclosure
The preceding review of the various standards imposed by
state and federal courts demonstrates that there is no clear
consensus of what showing the defendant should be required to
make in order to trigger in camera review. The variation in the
terms used for the standards, alone, demonstrates the confusion
in this area.'9' Similarly, courts have used a variety of terms to
describe when, after such a review, the judge must disclose
information to the defense.' 92 Rather than choose among these
various standards, I propose the following:
93
189 Commonwealth v. Barroso, 122 S.W.3d 554, 564 (Ky. 2003); accord State v.
Peseti, 65 P.3d 119, 129 (Haw. 2003); State v. L.J.P., 637 A.2d 532, 537 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1994).
190 Thus, in Peseti, even though the defendant had already elicited from the
defendant's foster sister that complainant had recanted her sexual-abuse allegation,
that witness's animosity toward the complainant may have undermined the sister's
credibility with the jury. Therefore, excluding references to the exculpatory
statement made to the counselor was not harmless error. See Peseti, 65 P.3d at 129-
30.
Similarly, in L.J.P., although the complainant had also recanted to other
witnesses (family members), those recantations could be discounted as having been
coerced. The same could not be said with regard to a recantation to a state agency's
psychologist; hence, exclusion of the latter was reversible error. See L.J.P., 637
A.2d at 537-38.
191 See, e.g., supra notes 148-162 and accompanying text.
192 See supra notes 153-160.
193 A critic might well ask: "Given the hodgepodge of standards and verbal
formulas already cluttering up the law, why not choose the best among the existing
ones, instead of proposing yet two more? Why add to the confusion?" My flippant
answer is: "Because I am a law professor, and adding to the confusion is what law
professors do best." Seriously, though, I believe (and hope) these proposals will
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(1) A judge must disclose information to the defense that is
otherwise protected by a patient-psychotherapist or similar
privilege'94 if the information casts significant doubts upon the
truthfulness or accuracy of the witness's testimony.
(2) The judge must conduct an in camera review of the
records if defense counsel makes a factually specific showing of
probable cause that such information will be found in those
records.
Defense counsel's ultimate goal is not merely in camera
review, but disclosure. Because it is necessary to define the
standard for disclosure in order to assess what counsel must
show to trigger a review, I will first discuss the disclosure
standard and then discuss what defense counsel must show to
require the judge to examine the records.
1. Recommended Standard for Disclosure: Information Raising
Significant Doubts upon the Truthfulness or Accuracy of the
Witness's Testimony
As noted earlier, courts have used a variety of terms to
describe the kind of information a judge must disclose to the
defense.' 95 At first glance, proposing the above standard may
seem strange. The Supreme Court, in Ritchie, applied a
196
materiality test. This standard has been applied by other
courts 197 and supported by scholars and commentators.! A
reader might reasonably ask: why propose a different
definition?
The difficulty is that, at least in this context, "materiality" is a
retrospective standard.99  In Ritchie, the Court held that
add greater clarity to the issues than any of the standards and verbal formulas
currently in use.
194 By "similar privilege" I mean the various privileges discussed above, whether
"absolute" or "qualified" in nature. See supra Part II.B.
195 See supra notes 153-160.
196 Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 58 (1987) (plurality opinion).
197 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fuller, 667 N.E.2d 847, 855 (Mass. 1996)
(inquiring before a judge conducts in camera review whether the evidence will
contain something material to defense).
198 See, e.g., Hebert, supra not" 23, at 1478 (advocating for disclosure of
privileged material only where the privileged material contains "relevant and
material evidence that would be admissible at trial").
199 Note, however that the materiality standard will first be applied prospectively,
where the trial court determines for the first time whether the information sought
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"Ritchie is entitled to have the CYS file reviewed by the trial
court to determine whether it contains information that probably
would have changed the outcome of his trial. '' 200 This standard is
not readily applicable to the midtrial (and occasionally pretrial)
decisions that a trial judge must make to disclose or withhold
information. Moreover, applied prospectively, the Ritchie
definition of materiality-"information that probably [will]
change the outcome of [the] trial" 201 _-sets the bar too high and
202
requires too much speculation on the part of the judge.
As discussed earlier, information contained in a prosecution
witness's counseling or therapy records is likely to be relevant
only to the extent that it undermines or impeaches that witness's
203testimony. Thus, the appropriate standard should be
expressed in that context: information in such records should be
disclosed to the defense only if, and to the extent, it raises
significant doubts upon the truthfulness or accuracy of an
important government witness's testimony. 4  The
will be material to the defense. See DiBlasio v. Keane, 932 F.2d 1038, 1041-42 (2d
Cir. 1991) (stating that the trial judge will make the initial determination regarding
whether the evidence will be material to the defense). The retroactive application
arises where the trial judge's decision is reviewed on appeal. See Ritchie, 480 U.S. at
58.
200 Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 58 (emphasis added).
201 Id.
202 For example, a judge might conclude that information highly damaging to a
witness's credibility might not change the outcome because, in the judge's opinion,
the State's case is very strong. But the Court rejected such thinking in 2006 in
Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006). See supra note 104. Conversely, a
judge who expects the defendant to be acquitted even without the information
might opt not to disclose it on the assumption that defense counsel does not need it.
This, too, would be an improper basis on which to withhold the information.
203 See Commonwealth v. Barroso, 122 S.W.3d 554, 562 (Ky. 2003) ("The
relevancy of evidence to a witness's credibility is universally recognized .... ").
204 Courts frequently address the issue in terms of "a witness's credibility." See,
e.g., Barroso, 122 S.W.3d at 563-64 (allowing the judge to review in camera the
records to examine whether they contained "exculpatory evidence," such as
evidence affecting witness's credibility). I avoid using the word "credibility"
because, in this context, it is both too broad and too vague. Suppose, for example,
the records reveal that a rape complainant tells people her father died when she was
a teenager because she is ashamed to acknowledge that in fact he is serving a life
sentence after several convictions for armed robbery. Or suppose a homicide
witness persists in saying that he was a star athlete in high school, even though he
actually occupied the bench often enough that by graduation, he had a legitimate
adverse-possession claim. Such information is arguably relevant to the witness's
"credibility" because it suggests that he or she will lie in order to improve how he or
she is perceived by others. But although a judge would have discretion to permit
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determination will be based on such indicia as certain medical
conditions, prior contradictory information, or other indications
of a witness's inability to testify accurately,20 5 and is consistent
with general principles of evidence law.
2. Recommended Standard for In Camera Review: Probable
Cause
It is clear that courts should not conduct a review of a
witness's records every time that the defendant requests it. To
do so would accord insufficient significance to the privacy of the
complainants and witnesses whose records are at issue,2 7 and in
addition could impose an undue burden on the judiciary. 8
Rather, a defendant should be required to offer evidence that
adequately suggests the records contain information that
satisfies the "significant doubts" standard described above.2 9
This must involve more than merely showing that the witness
received mental-health care or counseling of some kind.210
However, a defendant should not be required to prove that the
defense counsel to cross-examine the witness about these lies if the counsel learned
about them from an unprivileged source, see for example, FED. R. EvID. 608(b),
surely this information has so little relevance in assessing whether the witness
testified truthfully and accurately about the defendant's alleged crime that it would
be absurd to pierce the privilege of a witness's therapy or counseling records to
disclose such information to the defense. (After all, don't we all stretch the truth
from time to time?) (By the way, although the "author's dagger" does not say so,
George Lucas wanted me to play Han Solo in Star Wars (20th Century Fox 1977),
and hired Harrison Ford only after I turned him down.) Expressing the standard in
terms of the "truthfulness or accuracy of the witness's testimony," rather than the
witness's "credibility," makes it clear that the focus is on the testimony, rather than
the witness's character for truthfulness per se. Thus, if the records also reveal that
the rape complainant frequently and compulsively claims she was forced by others
to do things she did voluntarily but now regrets, or that the homicide witness has
significant difficulty in perceiving and recalling events accurately, or that a witness
has a particular reason for lying about the events in this particular case, the judge
would be obliged to disclose such information.
205 See supra Part V.B.2.c.; see also Barroso, 122 S.W.2d at 562 (citing case law for
situations where a witness's capacity is relevant).
206 See supra Part V.B.2.c.
207 See State v. Spath, 1998 ND 133, 18, 581 N.W.2d 123, 126. ("[H]aving the
trial court review confidential material is not a right. It is a discovery option, but
only after certain prerequisites are satisfied." (quoting State v. Hummel, 483
N.W.2d 68, 72 (Minn. 1992))).
208 Cf infra Part V.D.
209 See supra Part V.C.1.
210 See supra notes 145-147 and accompanying text.
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information does exist, nor, necessarily, establish the precise
nature of the information that is sought. Courts and legislatures
should keep in mind that this is a preliminary showing that
affords a defendant no more than a judicial in camera
examination of the records. In camera examination does intrude
into the witness's privacy, but the intrusion is comparatively
minor and controlled and will go no further (other than review
on appeal) unless the records contain information that in fact
satisfies the "significant doubts" standard. Accordingly, the
required showing must protect against "fishing expeditions" but
also accommodate the defendant's lack of concrete
knowledge. 1
Each of the verbal formulas that courts have developed to
describe the appropriate standard suffers from the same
weakness: a lack of precision. Take the formula proposed by
Kentucky's Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Barroso:
"[Elvidence sufficient to establish a reasonable belief that the
records contain exculpatory evidence., 212  The difficulty, of
course, is that the key phrase in this formula, "reasonable
belief," is not self-defining, and therefore, as a practical matter,
the standard defines very little. Every other definition coined by
the nation's courts to deal with this situation suffers from a
213
similar shortcoming.
In that regard, this area of the law reminds me of the Fourth
Amendment phrase, "probable cause," which is the factual
justification generally required to arrest or search.214 The most
recent, and perhaps the most precise, definition of that phrase
offered by the Supreme Court, with regard to probable cause to
search, is: "Probable cause exists when 'there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found
211 See also Hebert, supra note 23, at 1472.
212 Commonwealth v. Barroso, 122 S.W.3d 554,564 (Ky. 2003).
213 See supra notes 148-62 and accompanying text.
214 According to the Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. As a prosecutor and law professor, I have used, litigated,
taught, and written about the Fourth Amendment for nearly four decades.
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in a particular place.' 21 5 Presumably, "a fair probability" means
less than "more probable than not,, 21 6 the preponderance-of-
the-evidence standard sufficient to win a verdict in most civil
litigation, and the standard federal courts apply in determining
whether the factual requirements of an evidence rule have been
satisfied.217 "Probable cause," after all, determines only whether
the authorities may look for evidence, not whether it can be
218introduced. In essence, therefore, "probable cause" means
"substantially more than a mere suspicion, hunch, speculation,
or inference, but substantially less than 'more probable than
not.,,
2 19
Thus defined, probable cause strikes me as an appropriate
standard to apply to a defense counsel's motion for an in camera
215 United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 95 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 238 (1983) (emphasis added)). The Court has steadfastly refused to put a
mathematical value on probable cause.
216 For a general discussion of the requisite degree of probability the Fourth
Amendment requires, see 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.2(e),
at 66-90 (4th ed. 2004).
217 See, e.g., Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 176-77 (1987) (holding that
before the government may introduce evidence pursuant to FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(2)(E), the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule, it must persuade the
judge by a preponderance of the evidence that the factual requirements of that
exception-that a conspiracy existed, the declarant and the nondeclarant defendant
against whom it was offered were both members of the conspiracy, and the
statement was made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy-have been
satisfied).
218 Several years ago, I proposed a question to criminal procedure professors on a
listserve: based on your reading of Supreme Court and lower court opinions on the
subject, if you had to define "probable cause" numerically (10 percent probable? 60
percent probable?), where would you put it? (I did so at the end of a semester,
while grading exams, and received two dozen or so answers. Law professors are
desperate for distractions at that time of year.) As I recall, the consensus was at
about 30 percent. I did not archive the results, which, I acknowledge, reflect no
more than the opinions of those who bothered to answer. Still, perhaps there is
some small significance that this self-selected group of Fourth Amendment scholars
understand the law to permit the government to search someone's home, office, car,
etc.-i.e., to intrude substantially into that person's privacy-if it marshals facts that
show a 30 percent probability that particularly described evidence of a particular
crime or type of crime would be found.
219 This definition is of my own devising. I am aware of no court decision or
scholarly article that has offered it or anything like it. However, case law applies a
flexible standard for probable cause. See, e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
160 (1949) ("The rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception
affording the best compromise that has been found for accommodating these often
opposing interests."). For an excellent overview of how courts have viewed
probable cause, see 2 LAFAVE, supra note 216, § 3.2, at 24-35.
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review of a government witness's counseling records, which, like
the search of someone's home or office, is a significant intrusion
into privacy.
I acknowledge that, for several reasons, the analogy is far
from exact. First, the purpose of a physical search and seizure is
to seek out evidence of a crime or evidence connecting a suspect
with a crime. The purpose of the examination of records is to
look for evidence that tends to impeach testimony that a crime
was committed 220 or that the defendant committed it.221 Second,
in the case of a search, the person whose privacy is invaded is
usually suspected of wrongdoing.222 With regard to the records,
the person suffering the intrusion is often a crime victim 223 or
someone who coincidentally happened to be at the scene of the
crime. Third, a physical search usually intrudes upon no special,
privileged, therapeutic relationship. An examination of records
does precisely that. Each of these differences arguably militates
against applying the analogy.
There is, however, a consideration that perhaps offsets these
factors. A typical search is conducted by several police officers,
who inevitably see and learn much about the targeted individual
beyond that for which they are looking. So long as they acted
within the scope of the warrant, what they see or learn is fair
224game to be used at trial or in subsequent investigations. Thus,
220 This typically is the situation in a rape case where a defendant denies that
intercourse occurred or claims the complainant consented, and child abuse cases
where the defendant denies that he did what the child alleges. See supra Part
V.B.2.a.
221 This situation exists where a crime unquestionably was committed (for
example, an assault, or a homicide where the victim was shot or stabbed to death),
but defendant challenges the accuracy of a witness's testimony identifying him as
the perpetrator.
222 Although police may obtain a warrant to search the premises of a third party
not suspected of wrongdoing, see Zurcher v. Standford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 559-60
(1978), in the overwhelming majority of cases (ninety-nine percent or more in my
experience as a prosecutor, and an equal proportion of the reported opinions I have
read in my nearly thirty years as a professor and author of Fourth Amendment-
related issues), the warrant is directed at a location occupied or used by a suspect.
223 Such is the case in rape and child abuse cases. See generally Pennsylvania v.
Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 43-44 (1987) (plurality opinion) (child sexual abuse); United
States v. Doyle, 1 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1188 (D. Or. 1998) (rape and abduction victim);
People v. Stanaway, 521 N.W.2d 557, 562-63 (Mich. 1994) (sexual assault of child);
supra Part IV.B.
224 This is known as the "plain view doctrine." See, e.g., Horton v. California, 496
U.S. 128 (1990); see generally 2 LAFAVE, supra note 216, § 4.11(b), at 779-806
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that invasion of privacy is far more substantial than when an
individual judge conducts an in camera examination of a
witness's counseling records.
In any event, it is clear that a search or seizure by police
differs substantially from a judicial in camera inspection of a
prosecution witness's therapy or counseling records.
Nevertheless, I believe courts should apply the Fourth
Amendment probable cause standard. This standard requires
that, to secure in camera review, defense counsel must offer facts
sufficient to establish probable cause, substantially more than a
mere hunch, speculation, or inference, but substantially less than
"more probable than not,, 225 to believe that the records contain
information, of a kind counsel can describe at least in general
terms, that casts significant doubts on the truthfulness or
accuracy of the witness's, testimony. This strikes the appropriate
balance among the conflicting interests involved: the State's
interest in prosecuting the defendant,226 the defendant's right to
seek evidence of his innocence, and the witness's right to
privacy.
Employing such a standard would have at least one significant
fringe benefit: "probable cause," although far from precisely
defined, is a standard with which judges are reasonably familiar.
Moreover, the types of cases in which courts typically have
permitted in camera examination of a witness's counseling or
therapy records are consistent with a probable cause standard.
In a rape or child abuse case where the defendant can show that
the complainant has recanted her 227 allegations to friends or
relatives or has engaged in other conduct dramatically
inconsistent with her allegations, the strong assumption228 should
(discussing application of the doctrine to execution of a search warrant); 3 id. § 6.7,
at 479-500; id. § 7.5, at 671 et seq.
225 See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
226 See supra note 104.
227 In rare instances the complainant may be an adult male, and somewhat more
often, a male child. In the vast majority of such cases, however, the complainant is a
woman or girl. Hence, the use of the female pronoun here.
228 1 use the term "assumption" instead of "presumption" because in evidence
law, a "presumption" has a specific, technical meaning. A "presumption" is a
procedural rule that says if Fact A is established, then Fact B is also taken as true,
unless the adverse party produces sufficient evidence contradicting Fact B. See, e.g.,
FED. R. EVID. 301. Here, I propose that if Fact A (recantation or contradiction) is
established, then in camera examination of appropriate records ensues.
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be that probable cause has been established that counseling
records will contain similar evidence. 229 The same assumption
should apply if a defendant can demonstrate that a witness
suffered from substantial behavioral, mental, or emotional
difficulties at the time of the alleged crime or suffers from such
difficulties at the time he or she is to testify.2 30 Evidence of time-
relevant difficulties in perceiving, remembering, or relating
231
events also assumptively establishes probable cause.
A showing of probable cause by defense counsel thus should
be a prerequisite but should not automatically trigger the in
camera inspection. The availability to the defense of equivalent
evidence from less intrusive sources is an important factor in
deciding whether to conduct the examination, as well as whether
to disclose information. In applying this factor, however, a court
should keep in mind that statements made to or assessments
made by a witness's therapist or counselor may have much-
greater persuasive impact on a jury than statements made to
232
others.
D. Timing of In Camera Review and Disclosure
In the typical case, the information in a government witness's
mental health records is relevant, if at all, only to impeach that
witness's testimony. 33  This is so whether the witness is the
complainant in a sexual-assault or child abuse case, or a
noncomplainant witness in a different type of criminal trial, such
as a homicide or a drug conspiracy. Thus, it is difficult to see
how a defendant can reasonably claim a constitutional right to
pretrial disclosure of privileged information in such records.234
Rather, the timing of the in camera review and resultant
disclosure is to be resolved by weighing the conflicting interests
of the witness's privacy on the one hand, and convenience to the
defense and efficient use of court time, on the other.
229 See supra Part V.B.2.a.
230 See supra Parts V.B.2.b, V.B.3.
231 See supra Parts V.B.2.c, V.B.3.
232 See supra Part V.B.4.
233 See supra Part V.C.1.
234 If the records themselves, or the information therein, are not privileged, then
they generally are discoverable as a matter of course. See supra Part V.A.3.
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Some courts have directed that no in camera review of a
witness's records is to be made until after the witness has
testified on direct examination. 235 The advantage to delaying the
in camera review until this point is that it avoids even a limited
judicial intrusion into privileged matters until it is unequivocally
necessary. As California's Supreme Court expressed it:
When a defendant proposes to impeach a critical prosecution
witness with questions that call for privileged information, the
trial court may be called upon, as in [Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S.
308 (1974)], to balance the defendant's need for cross-
examination and the state policies the privilege is intended to
serve. Before trial, the court typically will not have sufficient
information to conduct this inquiry; hence, if pretrial disclosure
is permitted, a serious risk arises that privileged material will• . 236
be disclosed unnecessarily.
At least a few other state courts have hinted at least some
reluctance to permit the in camera review, let alone allow
disclosure of any information to the defense, until the trial itself
has begun. 237  Many of the decisions cited in this Article,however, do not squarely address the issue.
235 See People v. Hammon, 938 P.2d 986, 992-93 (Cal. 1997); Goldsmith v. State,
651 A.2d 866, 876 (Md. 1995). Such delay is not without precedent: the Jencks Act,
18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2006), entitles a defendant to receive copies of written statements
of government witnesses, but only after the witness has testified for the government
on direct. Id.
236 Hammon, 938 P.2d at 992 (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319 (1974));
see also supra Part III.A. Hammon was just such a case. Prior to trial, Hammon
sought access to his foster child's records in the hopes of challenging her allegations
that he had sexual intercourse with her at all; at trial Hammon conceded that he had
sex with her, insisting only that he had waited until she was fourteen (i.e., he
claimed to be guilty of a less serious crime than the top count with which he was
charged). Hammon, 938 P.2d at 987. Thus, his trial strategy "largely invalidat[ed]
the theory on which he had attempted to justify pretrial disclosure of privileged
information. Pretrial disclosure under these circumstances, therefore, would have
represented not only a serious, but an unnecessary, invasion of the patient's
statutory privilege and [state] constitutional right of privacy." Id. at 993 (citations
omitted). In a subsequent decision the court reaffirmed its rule, precluding pretrial
discovery or in camera review. People v. Gurule, 51 P.3d 224, 249 (Cal. 2002).
237 Connecticut's Supreme Court speaks of a defendant's right, "out of the jury's
presence," to seek in camera examination of the records. State v. Peeler, 857 A.2d
808, 841 (Conn. 2004) (quoting State v. Slimskey, 779 A.2d 723, 732 (Conn. 2001)).
This implies a midtrial procedure.
At least three state courts have held that a defendant is entitled to disclosure only
if, among other things, "'no less intrusive source' for that information exists." State
v. L.J.P., 637 A.2d 532, 537-38 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (quoting United
Jersey Bank v. Wolosoff, 483 A.2d 821, 826 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994); accord
State v. Peseti, 65 P.3d 119, 129 (Haw. 2003); Commonwealth v. Barroso, 122
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The concern expressed by the Hammon majority is legitimate:
even an in camera inspection of a witness's therapy or counseling
records constitutes a breach of the privilege and an intrusion into
the witness's privacy, and sometimes developments during the
trial may show that a pretrial review was unnecessary.
But where a defendant makes an adequate showing of
238
necessity, certainly the trial judge should have the authority, if
not the routine obligation, to conduct such an inspection prior to
trial. Where the records are extensive or the question whether
to order disclosure is a close one, which might require factual
hearings outside the jury's presence, mandating that the judge
wait until after the witness has testified on direct before
reviewing the records in camera could require extensive midtrial
delays.
Where in camera review reveals information that must be
disclosed, 239 as a rule such disclosure should be delayed until the
witness has testified on direct. 240 But where the records reveal
information that requires investigative follow-up by the defense,
waiting until midtrial to disclose it may significantly disrupt the
trial. Moreover, postponing disclosure until after the trial has
begun may seriously undercut defense counsel's ability to use
the information effectively. In this regard, consider Justice
Mosk's impassioned concurrence-in-result-only in Hammon:
Although [a defendant has the opportunity] to cross-examine
an adverse witness only in the course of trial, to do so
effectively he may have to undertake preparations long before.
More generally, to defend himself meaningfully, he must
S.W.3d 554, 564 (Ky. 2003) (speaking of "evidence [that] must be disclosed to the
defendant if unavailable from less intrusive sources"). This language also may
imply that the in camera review should wait until the trial, as only at that point is
the court likely to be able to assess with certainty whether a less intrusive source of
the information has been found.
Utah's Supreme Court has recognized that "[i]n the context of a case yet to go to
trial, the test becomes more difficult to apply because the trial court must anticipate
the efficacy of the material contained in the records in persuading the fact-finder to
discredit the victim." State v. Blake, 2002 UT 113, J 23, 63 P.3d 56.
238 See supra Part V.B.
239 See supra Parts V.B.1, V.C.
240 The analogy to the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2006), seems apt. See supra
note 235.
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usually seek out the truth immediately: He cannot wait until
the cause is called to trial.
241
Indeed, on occasion, review of such records might reveal
information that would cause the prosecutor to rethink whether
to press the case at all. Where the case relies almost exclusively
on the complainant's testimony and the records reveal a history
of false accusations of sexual assault under circumstances that
bear a striking similarity to the instant case, for example,242 it
may be that all participants in the case (defendant, prosecutor,
court, and even complainant) might ultimately be better off if
the information is disclosed to the defense and the prosecutor
prior to a trial that, it may turn out in the light of that
information, should not be held at all. The same may
occasionally be true in prosecutions of other crimes, where the
case relies on the uncorroborated testimony of a witness whose
therapy records reveal a chronic inability to distinguish fantasy
from reality.
To reiterate: even where a defendant makes a satisfactory
showing to trigger an in camera review of the records, pretrial
review and disclosure should be the exception, not the rule. But
a judge should have the option to conduct a pretrial review
where the situation appears to call for it, and, where compelling
241 Hammon, 938 P.2d at 994 (Mosk, J., concurring in the result). Justice Mosk
bitterly decried the Hammon majority's reversal of prior precedent permitting
pretrial discovery in appropriate cases, noting that while this reversal was permitted
by U.S. Supreme Court decisions interpreting the U.S. Constitution, it was not
mandated, as the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue. See id. at 1130-31.
"We 'should disabuse [ourselves] of the notion that in matters of constitutional law
and criminal procedure we must always play Ginger Rogers to the high court's Fred
Astaire-always following, never leading."' Id. at 995 (quoting People v. Harris,
886 P.2d 1193, 1219 n.1 (Cal. 1994) (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting)).
For those who do not recognize the reference, Fred and Ginger were the 1930s-
1940s equivalent of Brad Pitt and Angelina Jolie, only Fred was not handsome or
muscular and Ginger was willowy, not... er... Angelina-esque. Unlike Brad and
Angelina, who have co-starred to date in only one movie (MR. & MRS. SMITH
(Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation 2005)), in which Brad and Angelina play
professional assassins for rival criminal organizations who discover to their chagrin
that each has been assigned to kill the other; happily, several dozen deaths later,
love triumphs after all), Fred and Ginger made ten movies together between 1933
and 1949. Their genre was musical comedy, not movies about shooting people, and
when Fred and Ginger danced together the audience was transported into a world
of rhythmic, ethereal beauty. In other words, come to think of it, Fred and Ginger
were nothing whatsoever like Brad and Angelina.
242 Concerning admissibility of a sexual-assault complainant's prior allegations of
sexual assault, see 3 FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 41, §§ 19:42-47.
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reasons exist, should also be authorized to disclose appropriate
information prior to trial.
CONCLUSION
Whether a defense attorney should have access to a
prosecution witness's psychotherapy or counseling records
presents a conflict between three highly held values: a
prosecutor's right and duty to bring a suspect to trial, the
witness's right to privacy and to avoid exposure that might
interfere with his or her recovery, and a defendant's right to
obtain exculpatory evidence. A procedure has developed that
requires the trial judge to conduct an in camera inspection of
such records to determine whether they contain exculpatory
information, but only if the defendant first makes an adequate
preliminary showing that such information will be found. The
law governing this procedure, however, is ridden with vagueness
and uncertainties. As this Article has attempted to show, these
uncertainties are best resolved as follows:
(1) Just as a defendant has a right pursuant to the Due Process
Clause of the Sixth Amendment to seek such in camera review
243
when records are in possession of the State, so too a defendant
must be allowed to seek in camera review of records that are
possessed by a private entity, pursuant to the Compulsory
244Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment.
(2) In camera review of such records must be available
245
whether the privilege on its face is conditional or absolute.
(3) A judge must conduct an in camera inspection of such
records if, but only if defense counsel can offer specific evidence
that establishes probable cause to believe that the records in
question contain information that casts serious doubts on the
truthfulness or accuracy of the witness's testimony, and such
information is not available from less intrusive sources.246 As a
rule, the judge should not conduct such an inspection until the
witness has testified at trial but may conduct the inspection prior
243 See supra Part IV.A.
244 See supra Part IV.B.
245 See supra Part IV.A.
246 See supra Part V.C.
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to trial where it appears that postponing the review until after
*. . 247
the witness testifies may require a lengthy adjournment.
(4) The judge must release portions of the records to defense
counsel only if they contain information that raises a significant
question about the credibility of a witness or the accuracy of
testimony that is important to resolving important issues in the
248
case.
The solution I propose has its costs. 24 9 The possibility that a
judge might review a witness's therapy or counseling records
may undermine the witness's ability to cope with whatever
experiences or difficulties led the witness to therapy or
counseling in the first place. The far-more-upsetting possibility
is that the fear that such information will be provided to the
defense may diminish the witness's willingness to engage in
therapy or counseling at all. Each of these results is lamentable.
The alternative, however, is to increase the risk that an innocent
person will be convicted of a serious crime and deprived of his or
her liberty or, in an extreme case, his or her life. I believe the
latter is the greater evil, and a more liberal approach toward
judicial in camera review of such records, coupled with the
flexible disclosure standard for evidence that may raise a serious
question about the truthfulness or accuracy of the witness's
testimony regarding important issues of the case, strikes the best
balance.
247 See supra Part V.D.
248 See supra Part V.C.1.
249 The current state of the law also has its costs. In October 2006, I made a
presentation on this topic to the annual conference of the International Center for
the Study of Psychiatry and Psychology, Inc. in Bethesda, Maryland. The therapists
I spoke to knew in general of the possibility that their patients' records might be
subpoenaed; several told me that, accordingly, they put as little information as
possible in the records, generally noting in them only that a patient came to a
scheduled therapy session and that some progress was made. They acknowledged
that this could cause problems during a course of prolonged therapy, and that the
lack of information in the records meant that if for some reason another therapist
had to take over the case, he or she might have to start from scratch. They
expressed the belief, however, that protecting patient privacy made these potential
drawbacks necessary.
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